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In this age of globalism, new developments such as the Internet, the dig-
itization of enormous volumes of information, and the proliferation of interna-
tional business transactions have created opportunities for the multiterritorial
exploitation of copyrighted works.1 Now, bootleg copies of software, games,
videos, pictures, and sound recordings can be repeatedly duplicated to perfec-
tion before being distributed internationally over the Internet. 2 As a result, there
can be no doubt that U.S. copyright owners will desire protection of their exclu-
sive rights everywhere on Earth, regardless of the territory. One potential tool
for U.S. copyright holders is the extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright
law. This option is attractive because American intellectual property laws tend
I See Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transna-
tional Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 5 (1999); see also
Cross-Border DVD Strategies: Fulfilling DVD's Promise in Europe, SCREEN DIGEST, Feb. 1,
2001, available at 2001 WL 13182098.
2 See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GLOBAL JURISDICTIONS 359 (Dennis
Campbell & Susan Cotter eds., 1996) [hereinafter GLOBAL JURISDICTIONS]; Timothy L. Skelton,
Comment, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a Negotiated
Rulemaking Alternative, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 219, 219-20 (1998).
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to be more protective than those of other nations, because bringing an infringe-
ment suit at home is easier in an age in which technology has duplicated and
dispersed copyrighted works across the entire planet, and because U.S. federal
courts employ relatively broad discovery rules and high damage awards.
3
To illustrate the problems that can potentially arise, the following hypo-
thetical merits consideration: U.S. citizen X takes an artistic photograph pro-
tected under U.S. copyright law and sells copies at various art stores. Visiting
citizen Q of the country Xanadu purchases a copy, takes it back to Xanadu,
modifies the coloring, and incorporates it into his own picture collage. Impor-
tantly, Xanadu has not entered into an intellectual property treaty to which the
United States is a party. In doing so, Xanadu has decided that the traditional
copyright-owner exclusive rights to copy and distribute a photo are enough to
encourage artistic production without recognizing additional rights to display a
work publicly or to make a derivative work from an original copyrighted work.
Therefore, Xanadu has balanced its production/dissemination tradeoff more in
favor of dissemination than production. This view contrasts with many other
nations acceding to the Berne Convention 6 and the TRIPs Agreement.7 Xanadu
citizen Q posts his collage on his personal website, but he does not sell the work
or try to sell advertising space on the website. Nonetheless, U.S. citizens access
the website over the Internet and print out paper copies of the collage or save it
to a hard drive, a floppy disk, or a compact disk.
Additionally, U.S. citizen K purchases a copy of X's photo and takes it
to the same country Xanadu. In Xanadu, K incorporates X's picture into one of
his collages, and his studio employer sells copies of the photo. K eventually
returns to reside in the United States, but he periodically consults with the studio
and, for a licensing fee, authorizes the studio to make additional copies of visual
works to which he owns the Xanadu copyright when those works are sold out.
The art studio later decides to start selling copies of its works to U.S. citizens
over the Internet without notifying K. The studio delivers the copies ordered
3 See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37
VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 506-07 (1997).
4 See id.; see also, e.g., GLOBAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 2, at 45-46, 357.
5 Singapore, for example, has quite narrow adaptation and public-display rights for artistic
works. See id. at 273, 276.
6 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, Sept. 9, 1886, 123
L.N.T.S. 233, reprinted in 3 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1977) [hereinafter
Berne Convention]. The Berne Convention was completed at Paris on May 4, 1896; revised at
Berlin on November 13, 1908; completed at Berne on March 20, 1914; revised at Rome on June
2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24,
1971; amended at Paris on July 24, 1979; and entered into force for the United States on March
1, 1989. See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 82-85 (1995).
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual-Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
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over the Internet through the mail or transmits them electronically through a File
Transfer Protocol service.
Is there any way a U.S. federal court can apply U.S. copyright law to
grant X legal recourse against Q and K? This Article will attempt to provide
some insight and guidance to answer that question. The first and foremost con-
sideration, though, is that extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes is con-
strained in large part by the presumption against extraterritoriality, an American
legal concept limiting the subject-matter jurisdiction of all acts of Congress.8 As
discussed below, its application is far from uniform; however, its application to
U.S. copyright law, if erroneous in any particular manner, has been fairly uni-
form and consistent.9 At this point, though, a brief overview of the historical
legal evolution of this most significant limitation on the reach of U.S. copyright
law is instructive.
I. THE PRESUMPTION'S HISTORICAL EVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
The presumption against extraterritoriality originates from the United
States Supreme Court's directive "that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial boundaries of the
United States."' 0 Because it is widely recognized that there is no constitutional
bar reducing Congress's power to legislate extraterritorially, the rule is a mere
canon of statutory construction. In the early 1800's, the Supreme Court util-
ized the presumption to curtail the reach of federal piracy and customs laws.
12
The most famous statement of the presumption eventually came from the 1909
case American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,' 3 in which Justice Holmes said
that "the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as law-
ful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the
act is done."' 14 Although American Banana failed to extend the Sherman Anti-
trust Act 5 to anticompetitive conduct committed by a U.S. company in Costa
Rica and Panama, the lower federal courts found ways to avoid the application
of its holding to other antitrust cases as well as to cases under the Securities
8 See WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 208
(3d ed. 2000).
9 See infra Part IV.B-D.
10 Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
11 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 510-11.
12 See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 85 (1998).
13 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
14 Id. at 356.
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
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Exchange Act of 193416 and the Lanham Act.17 The Supreme Court repeatedly
denied certiorari for these cases during the ensuing decades.' 8 This pattern con-
tinued through 1987, when the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
disclaimed Holmes' famous statement as the current state of the law. 19 Then, in
1991, after forty years of silence since the decision in Foley Brothers v. Fi-
lardo,2° the Supreme Court rejuvenated the presumption by applying it in EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co. ("A ramco"). In Aramco the Supreme Court re-
fused to apply Title VII22 to a U.S. company in Saudi Arabia that employed a
naturalized U.S. citizen, even though administrative interpretations of Title VII,
its legislative history, and implications from its exemptions could have been
used to overcome the presumption against its extraterritorial application. Thus,
the Court appeared to have adopted a clear-statement rule requiring Congress to
explicitly rebut the presumption.23
Although the presumption's viability has generally fluctuated over the
past century, it remains a steadfast part of U.S. copyright law.24 In fact, until
this past decade, it has been relatively uncontroversial in its application to spe-
cific copyright cases. For an early example, in its 1908 decision in United
Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co.,25 the Supreme Court held that U.S. law
did not require the attachment of copyright notice to publications outside the
United States because it was unlikely that Congress intended to extend such a
legal requirement beyond its sphere of territorial control.26 Indeed, the trend of
strictly enforcing the presumption, at least with regard to copyright law (unlike
trademark and antitrust law), continued in the controversial 1994 Ninth Circuit
decision Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.27 In that case, the
court held that U.S. law does not prohibit a U.S. resident from authorizing for-
eign activity which would constitute copyright infringement if conducted in U.S.
territory.28 As discussed below, exceptions permitting the partial extraterritorial
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-25 (1994).
18 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 85-86, 91.
19 See id. at 86.
20 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
21 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
23 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 93.
24 Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095-96 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc).
25 208 U.S. 260 (1908).
26 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 524 (citing United Dictionary Co., 208 U.S. at 264).
27 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
28 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 524-25 (citing Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1090).
2002]
5
Wollman: Maneuvering through the Landmines of Multiterritorial Copyright L
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [
application of U.S. copyright law do exist, but most require at least one act of
direct infringement within U.S. territory.29
With the history of the presumption against extraterritoriality in mind,
this Article will map out all possible avenues for X to use in attempting to re-
cover for the exploitive conduct in Xanadu. In doing so, this Article will neces-
sarily explore the limits of the presumption in U.S. copyright law. It will also
take the position that these boundaries have generally been stretched by the fed-
eral courts as far as they should go without further direction from Congress and
that Subafilms was correctly decided.
In order to understand how the presumption specifically functions in the
copyright arena and why the political branches are the most proper and effective
vehicles for overcoming the above mentioned presumption30 when someone like
X looks for recourse in future decades, Part II of this Article will examine what
it means for U.S. laws to apply extraterritorially, and Part I will examine the
traditional rationales for and criticisms of the presumption.
II. WHAT THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY REALLY MEANS
There are three possible definitions of the presumption: (1) U.S. law ap-
plies only to conduct occurring within U.S. territory, even when foreign conduct
has effects in the United States, but not to any foreign conduct (the Holmes
view).31 (2) U.S. law applies only to conduct that has effects in the United States
even if the conduct occurs abroad. Moreover, U.S. law does not apply to con-
duct occurring within U.S. territory that only had effects abroad (the Bork
view).32 (3) U.S. law applies to conduct that either occurs within U.S. territory
or has effects there (the Mikva view).33
Another important question is whether or not the presumption is a clear-
statement rule. In other words, there is a question whether the presumption is
rebutted only by statutory language explaining the extraterritorial application of
the law or whether it is rebutted by any evidence seeming to indicate that Con-
gress desired extraterritorial application of the law at issue.
A. U.S. Law Applies Only to Conduct Occurring Within U.S. Territory
As mentioned above, Justice Holmes recited the traditional view of the
presumption in the 1909 American Banana decision when he said, "[T]he gen-
eral and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlaw-
ful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
29 See infra Part IV.B-D.
30 See infra Part III.D.
31 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 88.
32 See id. at 88, 96.
33 See id. at 88-89.
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done. 34 Also, the Ninth Circuit applied this reasoning in Subafilms, when the
court rejected the possibility that the presumption could be overcome simply by
showing that a U.S. party was adversely affected. 35 As explored below, the terri-
torial nature of copyright law,36 the public-international-law regimes,37 and the
basis for two of the well-recognized domestic exceptions permitting the partial
extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright law 38 are consistent with this view
of the presumption. Additionally, the European Commission rejected a "country
of origin" approach to transnational copyright disputes in favor of a territorial
approach consistent with this version of the presumption.39
B. U.S. Law Applies Only to Conduct Having Effects Within U.S. Territory
Judge Bork adopted this view of the presumption in Zoelsch v. Arthur
Anderson & Co.4° Additionally, the Supreme Court utilized it in Steele v. Bulova
Watch4 1 when it noted that a failure to apply the Lanham Act extraterritorially
would result in an adverse economic impact in the United States. The truly con-
troversial aspect of this view flows from Judge Bork's "doubt that an American
court should ever assert jurisdiction over domestic conduct that causes loss to
foreign investors. '' 2
This understanding results in considerable tension when applied to U.S.
copyright law. For instance, even if Congress intended the 1976 Copyright Act43
to prevent situations where an American citizen is economically harmed as in
Subafilms, one cannot contend that the statute was intended to cover only situa-
tions where the effects of copyright infringement are felt in the United States.
Such a contention fails to acknowledge (1) the foreigner receiving U.S. copy-
right protection by publishing his work in any member of the Berne Convention
or by conveyance as well as (2) the national-treatment provisions of any num-
34 See id. at 88 (citing American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356).
35 See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc).
36 See infra Part III.E.
37 See id.
38 See infra Parts IV.B-C.
39 Austin, supra note 1, at 3.
40 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
41 344 U.S. 280 (1952); see also United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927)
(due to effects in the United States, Sherman Act applied to conspiracy to monopolize sisal
imports carried out by U.S. citizens abroad).
42 Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32.
43 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-702 (1994).
4 See Austin, supra note 1, at 15-16; Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterrito-
riality in Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 592-93 (1997).
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ber of treaties which allow foreigners suing for infringement occurring in the
United States the same legal rights as U.S. citizens. If a foreigner holding a U.S.
copyright brought suit in a U.S. federal district court for copyright infringement
in the United States, this reading prevents U.S. law from applying to the situa-
tion and would result in dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Al-
though the conduct occurred exclusively in the United States, the effects would
have been felt abroad only in the country where the foreigner resides. Therefore,
unlike the Holmes view, the Bork definition of the presumption is entirely in-
compatible with U.S. copyright law.
C. U.S. Law Applies Either to Conduct Occurring in the United States or
Having an Effect There
Chief Judge Mikva expressed this view of the presumption in Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Massey.45 He noted that the Sherman Act, the Lanham
Act, and the Securities Exchange Act have all been applied to foreign conduct
when failing to do so presented a threat of adverse effects within the United
States.46 As the broadest view of what is not subject to the presumption, this
definition clears up the above copyright-law anomaly resulting from the Bork
view but leaves questionably little conduct not regulated by U.S. statutes in cer-
tain contexts. However, as a general principle, it is consistent with the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law's conception of the presumption, as the
Restatement permits a state to prescribe law with respect to "conduct outside its
territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.
47
To understand what this view adds to the Holmes view, exploring the
meaning of "effects in the United States" is necessary. Using the above hypo-
thetical as an example, "effects in the United States" means one of two things:
First, it may refer to the personal anguish and loss of creative motivation felt by
a U.S. rights holder such as X when he loses control over a work with which he
might not be satisfied. That is, distribution could occur in the United States
against his will after a U.S. citizen downloads from Q's website copies of the
collage containing X's image and either prints them out or saves them to a disk.
Second, it may refer to X's loss of the profits he would have made both here and
in Xanadu if his work had not been distributed for free as part of Q's derivative
work or had not been sold by the studio formerly employing K in Xanadu.
Removing foreign "conduct causing effects in the United States" from
the ground reached by the presumption has an obvious appeal over the Holmes
view in that it is more protective of U.S. interests. However, when applied to
U.S. copyright law, Mikva's view seems to nullify the presumption. Foreign
conduct made legal by the differing copyright regimes of other nations will un-
45 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
46 See id. at 531.
47 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(c) (1986).
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doubtedly cause both of the above effects in the United States a consequence of
the fact that digitized copyrighted works are now easier to copy and transmit
than conventional ones (and digitized copies are of the same quality as the
original) 48 is that the future domestic effects of foreign conduct will literally be
multiplied. The multiplied effects will cause the Mikva view to be so expan-
sive49 relative to the Holmes view that it will become the centerpiece for debate
about what the presumption against extraterritoriality really means when the
1976 Copyright Act is at issue. The material discussed in Part IV.D below will
similarly show how the current debate regarding the correctness of Subafilms
centers around the significance of foreign conduct's domestic effects. For the
sake of uniformity and simplicity, however, the rest of this Article will refer to
the Holmes view (U.S. copyright law applies only to conduct occurring in U.S.
territory) whenever it mentions the presumption.
D. Is the Presumption a Clear-Statement Rule?
Although some believed the 1991 Aramco decision set out a clear-
statement rule, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence since then has indicated that
this may not be the case.50 Rather, federal courts have examined any available
evidence of congressional intent in order to determine whether the presumption
has been rebutted. 51 A statute's aggregated provisions, its underlying purpose,
and nontextual sources such as legislative histories and administrative-agency
interpretations are fair game for analysis.52 Indeed, federal statutes have over-
come the presumption against extraterritoriality despite lacking a clear statutory
directive in the areas of antitrust law, securities law, admiralty law, trademark
law, and federal criminal law.53 Furthermore, the fact that the copyright statute's
exclusive-rights section 54 and general-infringement provision55 fail to address
issues of territoriality does not necessarily preclude a U.S. federal court from
finding that U.S. copyright law applies extraterritorially in some respect, at least
if a litigant presents appropriate supplementary evidence to rebut the presump-
48 See Kai Burmeister, Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, Copyright, and the Internet: Protection
Against Framing in an International Setting, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
625,631 (1999).
49 "This facet of territorial jurisdiction [the 'effects doctrine'] is more easily abused and thus
subject to more limitations under International Law." SLOMANSON, supra note 8, at 210.
50 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 110.
51 See id. at 97.
52 See id. at 111, 123.
53 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 519, 568; Sean A. Monticello, Subafilms Revisited: The
Case for Imposing Liability on Domestic Authorizers of Extraterritorial Copyright Infringe-
ments, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 101, 126 (1999).
54 28 U.S.C. §§ 106-106A (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
55 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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tion.
III. JUSTIFYING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Just as the precise meaning of the presumption as it generally applies to
various federal statutes remains unresolved, the rationale for the presumption in
the first place remains unfixed. For example, the United States Supreme Court
has articulated five different justifications for the presumption. Additionally,
secondary legal sources have described two more justifications. The bases for
employing the presumption with regard to U.S. copyright law will later provide
principles for analyzing the propriety of the various loopholes to the presump-
tion listed in Part IV.
A. The Congressional-Intent Justification
The foremost justification for the presumption - and according to one
scholar, Professor Dodge, the only legitimate one - is that it effectuates congres-
sional intent. The essential premise underlying the presumption, then, is that
Congress nearly always legislates with domestic concerns in mind.56 Although
the copyright statute, unlike the patent statute, contains no language indicating
that its scope is limited to U.S. territorial borders, a presence (rather than ab-
sence) of language may be needed to indicate that Congress had more than do-
mestic conditions in mind,57 at least according to the Aramco holding. When
Congress wishes to legislate extraterritorially, there is evidence that it does so
unambiguously. For example, the Economic Espionage Act of 199658 explicitly
makes conduct violating trade-secret protections and occurring outside the
United States subject to criminal penalties,59 and the Biological Weapons Anti-
Terrorism Act grants federal jurisdiction over defined extraterritorial offenses
committed by or against U.S. nationals.60
The effectuation of congressional intent appears in some respects to be
consistent with the constitutional sources of power for copyright and trademark
law and the divergent application of the presumption to each area. That is, the
power Congress used to pass each set of laws might reveal whether Congress
intended to reach extraterritorially in each case. The Lanham Act is based on the
56 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 516; Dodge, supra note 12, at 90. For example, when Con-
gress passed the Sherman Act, it was trying to prevent Standard Oil Company from monopoliz-
ing trade and raising prices. When it passed Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it was re-
sponding to the U.S. civil rights movement. When it passed the Securities Act of 1933, it was
responding to the stock-market crash precipitating the Great Depression. See Dodge, supra note
12, at 117-18.
57 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 522-23.
58 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (Supp. V 1999).
59 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 554.
60 See 18 U.S.C. § 175 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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expansively interpreted Commerce Clause61 granting Congress the authority to
regulate both interstate and foreign commerce, while copyright law is
grounded in a narrower, more explicit Article I, Section 8 grant of regulatory
power.63 As such, a federal court may have subject-matter jurisdiction over a
trademark dispute (if the plaintiff passes the Bulova-based balancing test) even
when there is no domestic act of infringement; however, at least one act of do-
mestic infringement is usually required for a federal court to have subject-matter
jurisdiction over a U.S. copyright-law dispute.64
Though one domestic act of infringement is required for copyright suits,
critics have pointed out that when the effects of conduct do not occur where the
conduct itself occurs, congressional intent has been more focused on harmful
effects in the United States and not on conduct occurring here.65 For instance,
Congress specifically excluded from Sherman Act coverage anticompetitive
conduct in the United States which causes exclusively foreign effects. 66 These
critics argue as an empirical matter that Congress gradually has turned its regu-
latory focus away from domestic conduct as a result of international investment
and trade, and thus the domestic-legislative-focus rationale is now largely out-
dated.67 Furthermore, when it is clear from the subject matter of a statute that
Congress was concerned with more than just domestic conditions, critics often
contend the presumption should be rebutted.68
However, the language or subject matter of the copyright statute (with
one possible small exception discussed in Part IV.A) does not clearly show that
Congress was concerned with more than domestic conditions,69 so these conten-
tions do not provide any clear answer for a statute that lacks language indicating
whether it should apply to extraterritorial events. Also, these contentions do not
entirely undermine this rationale for using the presumption. At best, they make a
case for arguing that the presumption should be easier to overcome with proper
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
62 The Lanham Act covers "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress."
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 284 (1952). In Aramco, the Supreme Court distin-
guished Title VII from the Lanham Act on this basis, applying the presumption to Title VII. See
Bradley, supra note 3, at 572; Dodge, supra note 12, at 94.
63 See Neil A. Smith, Obtaining Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the United States
for Infringement Abroad, 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 8, 14 (1994).
64 Of course, the U.S. federal courts disagree over whether mere authorization alone consti-
tutes a domestic act of infringement. See infra Part IV.D. 1.
65 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 118-19.
66 See id. at 119.
67 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 518-19.
68 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 123.




Wollman: Maneuvering through the Landmines of Multiterritorial Copyright L
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
evidence and that it does not represent a clear-statement rule. And, although
"Congress is more globally focused today than in the past, there is no empirical
evidence suggesting that Congress generally wishes to regulate foreign con-
duct, ' 7° even if Congress is more concerned with domestic effects than with
domestic conduct.
Critics also argue that just because the subject matter of the Copyright
Clause of the U.S. Constitution is narrower than that of the Commerce Clause,
the territorial confines of its regulatory reach are not necessarily narrower than
those of the Commerce Clause. 7' Furthermore, the source of Congress's power
to pass the copyright statute should not bear on its intent regarding extraterrito-
rial application. Nevertheless, this argument ignores the fact that the Commerce
Clause specifically refers to foreign commerce, whereas the Copyright Clause
appears on its face to concern itself with purely domestic matters, just as the
other provisions for establishing bankruptcy laws and post offices do. There is
no contention that Congress could not pass a copyright act grounded in both
clauses; however, such an intent would be nearly impossible to discern without
Congress's explicit indication.72 Otherwise, it would seem most logical to as-
sume that Congress intends to ground legislation in the constitutional power
most closely related to a particular statute. This assumption gives Congress a
background rule that forces it to clearly say otherwise. Indeed, the congres-
sional-intent rationale for the presumption is inextricably linked to the next ra-
tionale: giving Congress a clear background rule encourages it to address the
territorial implications of its legislation.
B. The Clear-Background-Rule Justification
Although this justification has not been utilized by the Supreme Court,
scholars have suggested that when federal courts give Congress a clear back-
ground rule, even if it is not the most desirable one, they encourage Congress to
predict the application of its statutes, effectuate its intent more precisely, and
provide guidance on extraterritoriality.73 The increase in international legislation
may actually increase the need for the presumption rather than decrease it, be-
cause sorting out the extraterritorial implications regarding a sizable mix of do-
mestic and international legislation would be a time-consuming and potentially
unwieldy task - the various Bulova-inspired tests for trademark cases being a
good example of such a sorting attempt. The Supreme Court demonstrated the
utility of this background-rule approach when the Court held that the issues con-
cerning the manufacture and sale of parts which would infringe a U.S. patent if
assembled domestically - but which were to be assembled abroad - were not
70 Bradley, supra note 3, at 557 (emphasis added).
71 See id. at 539.
72 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994).
73 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 555; Dodge, supra note 12, at 90.
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within the subject-matter jurisdiction granted to federal courts by the U.S. patent
statute, and then Congress amended the statute to cover such activity twelve
years later.74 Federal district courts were thereafter able to act with specific
guidance from Congress instead of applying uncertain, judicially created balanc-
ing tests.
75
In § 602 of the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress addressed the only situa-
tion in which it clearly wants U.S. copyright law to apply to foreign conduct: the
instance in which imports not in violation of the origin country's copyright law
enter the United States and infringe rights under U.S. copyright law.76 When the
Internet largely bypasses the effectiveness of § 602's protection (as it does in the
above case of X and Q), the presumption forces Congress to say that Q's web-
site in Xanadu is subject to U.S. copyright law by virtue of being accessible to
U.S. residents instead of making federal courts come to inconsistent rulings. In
other scenarios, Congress would be encouraged to be as explicit as it was in §
602.
There are two lines of criticism directed at this justification for the pre-
sumption. First, to be effective, the presumption must be a stable, unchanging
rule so that Congress may clearly perceive and respond to it.77 This situation
may still be possible in the future, but historically it has not been the case. When
Congress passed Title VII in 1964, the presumption was not considered good
law, and Congress had no idea that it would need to give a "clear statement"
regarding its intent to apply Title VII extraterritorially according to Aramco.
78
Second, all canons of construction, such as the presumption against extraterrito-
riality, have allocational effects which require an independent normative justifi-
cation.79 That is, a default rule refusing to apply U.S. copyright law extraterrito-
rially does more than force Congress to be more explicit; it systematically dis-
advantages transnational U.S. companies dealing in copyrighted materials.
However, for reasons discussed in Part II.D, establishing normative justifica-
tions for allocations of money and property is more the duty of the legislature
than of the courts. Therefore, it may not be entirely improper for a federal court
to use a background rule which encourages Congress to avoid shirking issues
bearing both on such allocations and on delicate international relations.
C. The Domestic Choice-of-Law Rules Justification
A third justification for the presumption is that it is consistent with do-
74 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 570-7 1.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 571.
77 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 122.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 123.
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mestic state-law choice-of-law tort rules to allow other sovereigns to determine
the lawfulness of allegedly infringing activities occurring within their borders.80
Copyright infringement is analogous to a property tort because a tort is a viola-
tion of a duty which the law imposes on one person to another and the 1976
Copyright Act demands that those subject to it respect the § 106 exclusive rights
of authors who create protected works.8' In American Banana,2 the 1909 Court
noted that the lex loci delicti rule for torts requires that the lawfulness of conduct
must be determined by the territory in which the conduct occurs.8 3 In fact, a
minority of states currently follow such a territorial choice-of-law approach due
to the lack of guidance and uncertainty inherent in the more modem choice-of-
law rules. 84 The lex loci rule also has the benefit of creating a uniform standard
that is easy to apply and minimizes the costs of determining what law applies in
complex multinational copyright-infringement cases.85
Nevertheless, this justification is now one of the most discredited justi-
fications for the presumption. Since 1909, state choice-of-law rules have under-
gone radical transformation. The strict territorial approach of lex loci delicti was
first replaced in the 1950's and 1960's by Currie's "governmental-interest
analysis," which asks whether the facts of a particular case implicate the policies
each legislature had in mind when it passed the particular forum or nonforum
statute which could potentially be applied to the case.86 The facts of a case might
implicate the policies of just one government's statute (a "false conflict"), no
government's statute (an "unprovided-for case"), or the statutes of both or all
jurisdictions (a "true conflict").8 7 In copyright cases, several jurisdictions will
likely be "interested" in the application of their laws as long as each has made
an effort to pass some form of a copyright statute whose policies appear to be
vitiated. 8 In any event, the approach leaves open the possibility that the forum
in which the suit is brought will apply its own law even if the alleged legal
wrong took place in another jurisdiction. This possibility is true especially when
the court is able to conclude that the forum's law source is interested but the
80 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 515.
81 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 661.
82 See supra Part I.
83 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 515 (citing American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356).
84 See id. at 546.
85 See Michael J. O'Sullivan, International Copyright: Protection for Copyright Holders in
the Internet Age, 13 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2000).
86 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 517-18; Dodge, supra note 12, at 115.
87 See GENE R. SHREVE, A CONFLICT-OF-LAws ANTHOLOGY 71 (1997).
88 Jurisdictions with relatively weak (or short-termed) copyright laws tend to be more inter-
ested in the dissemination of works, while those with stronger ones tend to be more interested
in encouraging authorship rather than facilitating public access. Cf Richard A. Epstein, Intel-
lectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803, 823 (2001).
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nonforum jurisdiction is uninterested in applying its law.89 This approach, of
course, is inconsistent with a strict application of the presumption against extra-
territoriality.
Eventually, Currie's approach gave rise to the 1971 Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws, which asks what tort law has the "most significant
relationship" to the parties and the transaction. 90 Section six of the Restatement
employs a balancing test which incorporates Currie's approach among a handful
of other factors. Again, it is entirely permissible for the forum to apply its own
law to events occurring outside its borders. Thus, as a result of the Restate-
ment's unpredictable application to any given case, its broad range of policy
factors, as well as other divergent modem approaches, there is no longer any
prevalent theory underlying choice-of-law doctrine, 9' much less one that is con-sistent with the presumption against extraterritoriality.
D. The Separation-of-Powers Justification
A fourth justification for the presumption is the separation-of-powers
rationale, which considers two different aspects of extraterritorial application:
institutional competence of the judiciary and constitutional prerogative. The
issue of institutional competence is raised by the fact that the judicial branch,
unlike the other two branches, does not have the same access to data concerning
U.S. economic and security interests throughout the world and the views of for-
eign governments.92 Additionally, "the case and controversy requirement [in the
U.S. Constitution], the rule of stare decisis, and the need to issue reasoned opin-
ions [all] undermine the ability of the judicial branch to anticipate and respond
to changing foreign political situations" in a timely manner.93 The fact that Con-
gress has been more frequently explaining the extraterritorial reach of federal
statutes in explicit language for courts to apply94 does not enhance the judici-
ary' s ability to ascertain their reach on its own - at least in the absence of proper
foreign-policymaking tools and constituent feedback. 95 The competence issue
becomes strikingly apparent when, in deciding whether or how to apply U.S.
statutes extraterritorially, a court creates a balancing test of various factors rep-
89 See id.
90 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 518; Dodge, supra note 12, at 115 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971)).
91 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 115.
92 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 550.
93 Id.
94 See SLOMANSON, supra note 8, at 208.
95 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 561. The increase in frequency might even increase the inter-
pretive significance of occasions when a federal statute is void of any language explaining its
extraterritorial reach. It tends to show that Congress knows how to make laws with extraterritorial
force when it so desires. See infra text accompanying note 240.
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resenting domestic and foreign interests.96 These tests enlarge judicial authority
to alarming levels whenever foreign-affairs issues are present because they sel-
dom provide courts with much guidance. 97 Also, they tend to be unpredictable in
their application, giving businesses little notice about how to structure decisions
and plan for potential litigation.98
The issue of constitutional authority relates to the fact that the U.S.
Constitution assigns the policymaking authority and the foreign-affairs powers
entirely to the legislative and executive branches; 99 therefore, the sensitive pol-
icy questions raised in determining whether or how to apply federal statutes to
foreign conduct ought to require a strict application of the presumption.1°° When
foreign copyright infringement does have effects in the United States, one
proper solution (before invoking the extraterritorial application of U.S. copy-
right law) is to call on the political branches of the federal government to con-
vince foreign nations to strengthen or better enforce their own intellectual-
property laws or to threaten them if they do not.1°1 In recent years, this is ex-
actly what they have done. 0 2 If used to resolve questions of extraterritoriality,
the case-by-case judicial-decision-making process could substantially impair the
ability of the executive branch to perform in this capacity, such as when it at-
tempts to negotiate an international intellectual-property treaty with favorable
terms. 103 For example, the executive branch has authority to sue other member
countries in a World Trade Organization ("WTO") forum if their intellectual
property laws do not comply with the TRIPs Agreement, and if successful, the
executive may need to retaliate against the sued country for refusing to comply
with the awarded WTO remedy.' °4 The federal judiciary already seems to rec-
ognize its potential to interfere with such delicate matters when a legal doctrine
other than the presumption against extraterritoriality is at issue. That is, the fed-
eral judiciary still strictly enforces the political-question doctrine with respect to
foreign affairs - even though the doctrine has been subject to erosion in other
96 See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1310, 1311-13 (1985).
97 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 555-56.
98 See id. at 556.
99 For an example of Congress's exercise of this authority, see H.R. Res. No. 609, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 18-20 (1988); S. Rep. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-5 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3707-10.
1oo See Bradley, supra note 3, at 516.
101 See, e.g., GLOBAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 2, at 46-47.
102 See, e.g., II WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1293-94 (1994).
103 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964).
104 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 572.
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fields.'05 The same considerations of constitutional policymaking authority
ought to factor into the vitality of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Nonetheless, some critics contend that it is actually judicial activism for
a court using the presumption to always balance the conflict between avoiding
disharmony with foreign nations and effectuating Congress's concern for do-
mestic conditions in favor of the former. 1°6 They feel that as a matter of legisla-
tive intent, Congress cares much more about remedying foreign conduct causing
domestic ills than avoiding foreign conflicts. As an example, they point to the
strenuous, unwavering foreign objections to congressional acquiescence in the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law, which they claim have led in the
long run to the negotiation of friction-relieving agreements providing for inter-
national antitrust cooperation rather than to interference with such agree-
ments.
107
This contention questionably assumes that the judiciary will always be
able to decipher astutely when its extraterritorial application of U.S. law will
engender long-term international cooperation rather than discord, since that
happened to be the case in the antitrust arena. At a more basic level, it also fails
to address the fact that the federal judiciary has neither the institutional re-
sources, the democratic mandate, nor the constitutional authority to consistently
and soundly make such delicate foreign-policy judgment calls, as discussed
above. Finally, although it accurately recognizes that Congress is normally more
often concerned about alleviating the effects of conduct on domestic conditions
instead of avoiding international conflicts, the critics' contention wrongfully
posits that the judiciary can effectively and regularly decipher which concern is
the case. It thereby fails to acknowledge that the judiciary will likely be more
accurate in doing its job (effectuating congressional intent) with a bright-line
background rule than it would be if it tried to surmise when foreign conduct
causing effects in the United States was intended to be subject to regulation,
because Congress rarely even considers foreign conduct at all while fashioning a
rule to govern what appears to be a predominantly domestic problem (such as
the need for encouraging the domestic creation of intellectual property in 1976).
For the rare situation in which Congress does clearly take foreign conduct into
consideration but does not explicitly address it in its resulting statute, a recogni-
tion of Congress's predominant concern for domestic conditions would be an
appropriate type of evidence to consider in determining whether the presump-
tion has been rebutted and would involve the federal court in a more appropriate
statute-interpreting role. The critics assume inaccurately that Congress regularly
considers foreign conduct in the first place.'0 8 If it has not done so in a particular
105 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 904 F.2d 601, 602 (11 th Cir. 1990); see Bradley, supra
note 3, at 560.
106 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 120.
107 See id. at 121-22.
log See Bradley, supra note 3, at 557.
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case, constructing a blanket rule to govern the case as though Congress normally
considers it (i.e., a nonrecognition of the presumption against extraterritoriality)
is yet another form of judicial activism - a form that is less consistent overall
with the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers.
E. The International-Law Justification
A fifth justification for the presumption, one cited by the Supreme Court
in Aramco,1°9 is its consistency with international law.110 A longstanding canon
of statutory construction mandates that if possible, a court should interpret a
federal statute so as not to violate international law. 111 International law appears
to support the presumption on both a general and specific level.
As a matter of general customary international law, there is at least
some limit to a country's legal ability to impose its laws on people and conduct
beyond its borders. 12 Critics of the presumption have pointed out that through-
out this century, though, there has been an expansion of the legal grounds on
which a country may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over (1) its nationals'
behavior wherever they go (the "nationality principle") and (2) foreign conduct
which causes effects or is otherwise completed within its territory (the "objec-
tive territorial principle")." 3 Additionally, (3) the "passive-personality princi-
ple" permits a state to protect its own nationals from conduct outside its bor-
ders, 14 (4) the "protective principle" permits a state to defend itself from hostile
acts in other states having potentially adverse effects within the state," 5 and (5)
the "subjective territorial principle" permits a state to punish illegal conduct that
starts within its borders and ends abroad. 1 6 As early as 1927, the Permanent
Court of International Justice acknowledged that international law leaves states
wide discretion in applying their laws extraterritorially, subject to limited excep-
tions."i
7
Nevertheless, the criticisms of the more general international-law justi-
fication are dwarfed by the more specific considerations which support the pre-
sumption in one particular legal area: international intellectual-property law."l 8
109 See supra Part I.
110 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 510.
I' See id. at 514-15.
112 See id. at 514.
113 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402, 404 (1986).
"4 See SLOMANSON, supra note 8, at 213.
15 See id. at 214.
116 See id. at 209-10.
17 See id. at 210-11; Dodge, supra note 12, at 114.
118 See Austin, supra note 1, at 22.
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Many bilateral and multilateral treaties regulate their member countries' protec-
tion of intellectual property in a structured manner. 19 The most important multi-
lateral treaties include the Universal Copyright Convention,120 the Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property,' 2' the Berne Convention, the
TRIPs Agreement, and NAFTA.122 These agreements all contain two themes
which seem to indicate.an international consensus that intellectual-property laws
are territorial: the minimum-rights principle and the national-treatment princi-
ple. 23 The territorial nature of intellectual-property laws would furthermore be
in harmony with a Holmes-variety presumption against the extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. copyright law, but not a Bork- or Mikva-variety version of the
presumption. 124
First, the above agreements try to harmonize intellectual-property laws
by mandating a base level of protection for the intellectual property recognized
in each country. Variation in each country's law is permitted to the extent that it
only increases the level of protection above the base level. However, legitimate
variations would end up being nullified if one member country could apply its
copyright law to conduct occurring in another country's territory, regardless of
whether that conduct caused harmful effects within the former country. 125 It is
also not clear why the members of the above treaties would agree on the goal of
harmonization if the differences among various countries' copyright regimes
were not legitimate and fully applicable within their respective borders.' 26 Es-
sentially, extraterritorial application would engender a "race to the top"; any
business in each member country operating entirely on a domestic level would
have to be mindful of the most protective country's copyright laws when han-
dling intellectual property. Additionally, when dealing with copyrighted materi-
als originating from the other member countries with various levels of lower
protection, businesses would have to be cognizant of each variation and tedi-
ously apply it to all corresponding works according to the works' origin. 1 27
119 See James A.R. Nafziger, NAFTA 's Regime for Intellectual Property: In the Mainstream of
Public International Law, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 807, 808 (1997).
120 Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, as last
revised, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178.
121 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised,
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
122 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289, 32
I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994); see Austin, supra note 1, at 22; Bradley, supra note 3,
at 546-47; O'Sullivan, supra note 85, at 27-28.
123 See Austin, supra note 1, at 23-24; O'Sullivan, supra note 85, at 27.
124 See supra Part II.
12 See Austin, supra note 1, at 25; Bradley, supra note 3, at 549.
126 See O'Sullivan, supra note 85, at 40.
127 See Stephen Labaton, Can Defendants Cry 'E-Sanctuary' and Escape the Courts?, N.Y.
TIME-S, September 22, 1999, at G39; cf SLOMANSON, supra note 8, at 213. Scholars question the
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Second, the above agreements are based on a national-treatment princi-
ple which prohibits each member country from discriminating against foreign
nationals when adjudicating intellectual-property disputes under its laws. 128 This
protection for foreign nationals provides little additional value if the foreign
national's home country's law applies to the allegedly infringing conduct in
other member countries. 129 The extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright law
would produce an anomaly for the non-discrimination goal of the national-
treatment approach: A U.S. citizen may receive greater protection abroad in the
country of infringement than would a national of the country of infringement
itself owning the same intellectual property and bringing suit in home terri-
tory. 130 The original concern for foreign discrimination that prompted the na-
tional-treatment principle would thus be turned on its head if intellectual-
property laws were not territorial.
As one final point supporting the international-law justification, the
Berne Convention itself mandates that copyright protection "shall be governed
exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed."'' Although
the interpretation is not without objection, most scholars have construed this
language to mean that the applicable copyright law is that of the country where
infringement physically occurs rather than that of the country where the rights
holder brings the lawsuit. 32 The majority interpretation also is in harmony with
the Holmes view of the presumption. 1
33
F. Doctrine-of-International-Comity Justification
Whereas the international-law justification focuses on the mandates and
prohibitions of international treaty regimes, this sixth justification focuses on a
voluntary, magnanimous deference to the domestic legal regimes of other na-
tions to avoid clashes between the laws of the forum and nonforum nations
when either set of laws could theoretically be applied to an international copy-
"passive personality" jurisdictional principle - which allows a jurisdiction to prosecute a foreigner
for harming one of its citizens while that citizen is abroad - for similar reasons. It would theoreti-
cally subject a resident of a large, diverse city to the criminal codes of numerous jurisdictions,
depending on who he passed in the street. Id.
128 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 547-48.
129 See id. at 548.
130 See id.; O'Sullivan, supra note 85, at 27.
131 Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(2) (emphasis added)
132 See Austin, supra note 1, at 24-25; Bradley, supra note 3, at 549 n.222; O'Sullivan, supra
note 85, at 37. There are nonetheless those who contend that the Berne conflict-of-laws rule points
to the application of the law of the forum nation when it is the location from which the infringe-
ment had a type of "nerve center" origination. See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 600-01.
133 See supra Part [I.A.
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right dispute.134 In Aramco,135 the Supreme Court used this rationale to attempt
to avoid the international discord which could result from applying Title VII to
an American company in Saudi Arabia. 36 In its famous trademark-law decision,
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. ,137 the Court even explicitly made the absence of
conflict with foreign trademark law a factor in its three-part test.' 38 Also, inter-
national-comity principles were part of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Subafilms.3 9 In the same spirit as one of the separation-of-powers rationales
discussed above, the Subafilms court expressed concern about the possibility
that application of U.S. copyright law to the domestic authorization of foreign
conduct might cause discord interfering with the efforts of the political branches
to obtain multilateral intellectual-property protection, especially since the
United States was already a member of two such treaties which seemed to re-
quire recognition of a rule of territoriality for copyright law - the Berne Con-
vention and the Universal Copyright Convention.1
40
In addition to interfering with the negotiation of bilateral and multilat-
eral intellectual-property treaties, the extraterritorial application of U.S. copy-
right law might foster disruptions to existing international dispute-settlement
procedures under the WTO as well as to the use of Special 301 trade sanctions1
4
'
in inducing foreign nations to enhance their own intellectual-property protec-
tion.142 When the United States Trade Representative considers using Special
301 in such an instance, she must also assess U.S. political and economic inter-
ests aside from the intellectual-property owners, the potential adverse impact on
national security, the potential ineffectiveness of raising tariffs, and the status of
executive negotiations - all evaluations not easily performed and weighed to-
gether by federal courts. 43 Because the goal of this delicate process is to induce
"priority" foreign countries to enact and enforce their own intellectual-property
laws, it would be disruptive and inconsistent for federal courts to apply U.S.
copyright law to conduct occurring within the "priority" foreign country as
though that country's laws did not count.144
134 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 515.
135 See supra Part I.
136 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 92 (citing Aramco, 244 U.S. at 287-88).
137 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
138 See id. at 285-86.
139 See infra Part IV.D.
140 See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc); Smith, supra note 63, at 15.
141 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1994).
142 See II PATRY, supra note 103, at 1293.




Wollman: Maneuvering through the Landmines of Multiterritorial Copyright L
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
Empirical evidence also exists to support the international-comity ra-
tionale. For instance, international entities expressed outrage when the recent
Helms-Burton Act 145 and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996146 included ex-
traterritorial regulations as well as when federal courts applied U.S. antitrust law
extraterritorially on several occasions. The antitrust-law decisions additionally
resulted in diplomatic protests, antisuit injunctions, and foreign blocking stat-
utes. 1
47
Professor Bradley argues that although it seems ironic, the current age
of globalism actually heightens the need for a territorial approach to intellectual
property, because the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws is more parochial
than global insofar as it thwarts international cooperation and comity.148 The
underlying premise is that
[b]ecause every nation is acknowledged to have jurisdiction to
regulate activities that occur within its own borders and because
it is more common for the effects of conduct to be felt in more
than one nation than it is for the conduct itself to occur in more
than one nation, the surest way to avoid [the tension of] having
more than one law apply to the same activity is to assign pre-
scriptive jurisdiction exclusively on the basis of where the con-
duct occurs. 149
The extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright law is not cooperative because
it is prone to upset the intricate policy balances that a foreign government has
made in constructing its own copyright law.' 50 Because copyright law involves
granting a monopoly and limiting competitive uses of artistic and literary crea-
tions for a limited period of time, each nation must weigh the costs of limiting
the diffusion and use of information in copyrighted form against the ultimate
social enrichment gained by promoting the creation of works (assuming the na-
tion does not employ a natural-rights framework of copyright law).' 51 This pro-
duction-dissemination tradeoff will likely be struck to meet the needs of the
145 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 (Supp. IV 1998).
146 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. IV 1998).
147 See Nomination of William Barr as Attorney General: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 102nd Cong. 47-48 (1991) (statement of William Barr, candidate for U.S. Attorney
General); Bradley, supra note 3, at 546 & n.258. As discussed above, some commentators believe
that such reactions are positive insofar as they precipitate international agreements and coopera-
tion in the long run. See supra text accompanying note 107.
148 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 584.
149 Dodge, supra note 12, at 115.
150 Cf. SLOMANSON, supra note 8, at 207.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss2/6
MANEUVERING THOUGH THE LANDMINES
particular country at issue, as was the case for the hypothetical country Xanadu,
by varying the types of exclusive rights granted to the creator, the term-of-
protection length, and the scope of the property rights granted. The extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. copyright law could deprive foreign markets of informa-
tional and artistic products which their governments see fit for dissemination.
52
A foreign nation could potentially become so offended by this deprivation that it
enacts a contrary law of its own to try to block the disrupting effects of the U.S.
law.' 53
Critics of this rationale for the presumption point out that it cannot be
very important because the Supreme Court does not use it consistently. 5 4 In
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,155 the Court refused to apply the pre-
sumption even though the Sherman Act had a clear conflict with foreign law.
156
Conversely, the Supreme Court applied the presumption in two other cases' 57 in
spite of the fact that no conflict with foreign law existed.1 58 Second, they con-
tend that Congress itself has not been overly concerned about U.S. statutes con-
flicting with foreign laws. For example, not only has Congress failed to amend
the Sherman Act to prevent the extraterritorial application permitted by federal
courts, but it has also amended Title VH so that it would apply extraterritorially
after the Aramco decision. 159 Third, they argue that Congress's desire to aid the
interests of domestic constituencies should override any judicial concern about
conflicts with foreign laws; due to the bright-line nature of the presumption,
these interests will almost always automatically be sacrificed even if no conflict
with foreign law really exists. 160 Fourth, they claim that conflicts with foreign
laws can sometimes result in international cooperation and negotiation, as they
152 See Austin, supra note 1, at 4, 22, 28; Bradley, supra note 3, at 539-40. A similar issue
arose outside of the realm of intellectual-property law when a French court ordered Yahoo, Inc. to
pay damages to anti-racism groups that brought a civil suit against it for violating a French law
that prohibits the sale or display of materials inciting racism. Yahoo conducts online auctions of
neo-Nazi materials only on its American website, not its official French website, and the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits it to disseminate such items in the United States.
Furthermore, the French court's attempt to dictate the English content of a website run entirely by
an American company located in the United States generated considerable controversy, regardless
of the fact that Yahoo's American website was accessible to French citizens. See French Court
Says Yahoo Broke Racial Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2000, at C27.
153 See Monticello, supra note 53, at 128 n. 125.
154 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 98.
155 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
156 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 98 (citing Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 764).
157 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); Smith v. United States, 507
U.S. 197 (1993).
158 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 556-57; Dodge, supra note 12, at 116.
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have in the antitrust area. 161
The presumption's preservation of international comity at the expense
of harmed domestic interests can be justified, nevertheless, if one considers that
the judiciary lacks both the authority and resources to engage in policy analysis
balancing the two values. By engaging in such analysis on its own accord, the
judiciary risks independently creating international discord that implicates diffi-
cult foreign-policy questions and interrupts dialogue. 162 The presumption always
strikes the balance in a way that forces Congress and the executive branch to
make the tough foreign-policy calls, just as the U.S. Constitution would have it.
Congress's lack of empathy for foreign-law conflicts in the antitrust and Title
VII arenas in no way cloaks the federal judiciary with the power or authority to
independently make judgments which affect international negotiations in other
areas. Indeed, the tactic of using international friction in hopes of causing coop-
erative efforts down the road is at best a risky device which should only be used
when a political branch makes that conscious and strategic decision on its own.
G. Encouraging International Business Transactions and Investments
Even though critics contend that the presumption harms U.S. copyright
holders when it fails to relieve them of the effects of foreign infringement,
secondary legal literature has suggested that in other ways the presumption is
balanced by being an asset to many American multinational companies. The
strict territorial approach to U.S. copyright law resulting from the Holmes view
of the presumption 63 enables U.S. companies to rely on the application of
foreign laws creating (or not creating) intellectual-property rights abroad,
thereby fostering a degree of certainty in international commercial relations.164
When it is not clear whether U.S. or foreign copyright law applies to
commercial conduct abroad, the uncertainty can bring about inconsistent legal
requirements, increased planning costs, and the discouragement of what would
otherwise be vigorous business activity. 165
H. Conclusion on the Rationales Behind the Presumption
All in all, whatever the viability of each individual rationale may be, the
presumption will remain a part of American jurisprudence as long as there is
merely one legitimate justification. While the Supreme Court's application of
161 See id. at 117; supra Part III.D.
162 See Austin, supra note 1, at 47-48.
163 See supra Part II.A.
164 See Austin, supra note 1, at 4.
165 See Pamela E. Kraver & Robert Purcell, Application of the Lanham Act to Extraterritorial
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the presumption may be inconsistent across a variety of statutes, the above ra-
tionales have managed to keep the presumption a constant force behind U.S.
copyright law.' 66 One scholar has even posited that the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act 67 confirms Congress's territorial conception of U.S. copyright
law.
168
Furthermore, the question remains how X can try to obtain protection
against the acts of Q and K described above if the presumption is strictly applied
to U.S. copyright law. Another related issue is how the presumption actually
will be applied to U.S. copyright law in difficult multinational cases. The Inter-
net, the digitization of information, and the rise of global commercial transac-
tions will undoubtedly cause the "effects" of foreign infringement of U.S. copy-
rights to be felt at home more than ever, in turn igniting a fire under U.S. rights
holders to find ways around the presumption against the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. copyright law. As will be apparent, this fire's most controversial
aspect relates to the fact that as the effects of foreign infringement are increas-
ingly used to justify exceptions to the presumption (or to justify the narrow
Mikva definition of the presumption169), less and less of. the presumption re-
mains to be applied to foreign conduct and to vindicate its underlying rationales.
Part IV below explores loopholes that are potentially available recourse for X,
who would like to find any way he can for U.S. federal courts to reach foreign
acts affecting his intellectual-property rights.
IV. FINDING LOOPHOLES TO THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Using 17 U.S.C. § 602
Though it is not much of a loophole in the above hypothetical, this
section of the 1976 Copyright Act has been recognized as the only part clearly
demonstrating that, in certain respects, Congress wants U.S. copyright law to
apply to foreign conduct causing domestic effects. 70 As such, it is the only one
of the five loopholes that has a strict statutory basis. Section 602 allows a U.S.
copyright holder to prohibit the importation into the United States of "piratical
articles" - articles made or copied in any nation in violation of either foreign
domestic law or U.S. copyright law, even though U.S. law would not otherwise
be applicable.' 7' Another extraterritorial aspect of the section comes into play by
prohibiting the importation of materials that are lawfully made or copied in a
foreign nation but are nevertheless forbidden to be distributed in the United
States by the U.S. copyright holder. 72 At most, X could have customs officials
166 See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095-96 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc).
167 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (Supp. IV 1998).
168 See Austin, supra note I, at 47.
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prevent wholesale orders of the collage copies (purchased by U.S. citizens from
the website of the Xanadu studio formerly employing K) from being mailed to
those citizens. 173 Section 602 is thus most useful for preventing direct
infringement of the § 106 right to distribute analog media.1 74 However, Q's
World Wide Webpage and the FTP service used by the studio that employed K
nullify the protections of § 602.
B. Using the Update Art Doctrine
Federal courts have permitted the application of U.S. copyright law to
conduct occurring outside U.S. borders whenever an initial, predicate act of in-
fringement in the United States leads to extraterritorial profits or to further ex-
ploitation abroad. 175 The predicate act must actually be an infringement of an
exclusive right granted by 17 U.S.C. § 106: the rights to reproduce, prepare de-
rivative works, distribute, perform, and display. 7 6 For example, either illegally
translating a book in the United States or uploading its contents to a U.S. server
for the purpose of distributing it abroad would enable the U.S. copyright holder
to successfully recover both the domestic and foreign profits in a U.S. infringe-
ment suit.177 This approach is based on the "objective and subjective territorial
principles," which permit a country to regulate conduct outside its borders if an
element of the offense at issue takes place within its borders. 178 The principles
are normally not interpreted so broadly as to permit the extraterritorial applica-
tion of a nation's laws merely when effects are felt within that nation (unless the
effects are somehow actually an element of the offense). 179
169 See supra Part II.C.
170 See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096; Monticello, supra note 53, at 131 n.137.
171 See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 533-35 (5th ed. 2000) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 602).
172 See generally Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378,
1389-91 (C.D. Cal. 1993). But see Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523
U.S. 135 (1998) (holding that materials lawfully made in the United States - and thereafter extri-
cated from their author's control by means of § 109(a) - are not subject to the § 602 prohibition
and thus can be legally imported after they find their way abroad).
173 Section 602(a)(2) permits the limited importation of a single infringing material for private
use (but not for distribution).
174 See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 589.
175 See Austin, supra note 1, at 8; Bradley, supra note 3, at 525-26; Smith, supra note 63, at 15;
Reuters Asks High Court to Overturn 9th Cir. in Suit over Riot Film, 5 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP.
LmIG. REP. 5 (1999).
176 See Smith, supra note 63, at 16.
177 See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 598; Smith, supra note 63, at 16.
178 See SLOMANSON, supra note 8, at 209-10.
179 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 575 n.341.
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In Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd.,' 80 an editor of an Israeli
magazine photographed a poster on an office wall in the United States and pub-
lished the unauthorized copy in his magazine, which he distributed in Israel. The
Second Circuit upheld a damages award based in part on the foreign profits.' 8'
By way of contrast, in Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 82 when priests
gave unauthorized performances of "Jesus Christ Superstar" in both Canada and
the United States, the same court held that the performances in Canada could not
be included in a damages award because the preparations, arrangements, and
rehearsals in the United States for the Canadian performances were not infring-
ing acts in themselves. 83 The difference between these two cases hinges on the
legal theory which posits that when an infringer makes an unauthorized repro-
duction in U.S. territory, the rights holder acquires an equitable interest that
clings to any copy wherever it goes, attaching profits and increases in stock
value attributable to the copy. 84
This loophole is unavailing to X because neither Q nor K committed
any real predicate acts of infringement in the United States. Each made a
legitimate purchase and then used it in Xanadu to create a legal derivative work
in that territory. 85 Also, Q receives no profits from his use of X's work, and K
no longer possesses or utilizes it now that he again resides in the United States.
C. Using the Contributory-Infringement Doctrine
Any U.S. rights holder has a cause of action against "one who, [1] with
knowledge of the infringing activity, [2] induces, causes[,] or materially con-
tributes to the infringing conduct of another."1 86 This loophole for contributory
infringement appears to result in the extraterritorial application of U.S. copy-
right law insofar as it reaches the entirely foreign conduct of one who authorizes
or induces abroad, but it truly remains grounded in strict territorial principles by
requiring some underlying act of direct infringement of a § 106 right within U.S.
180 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988).
181 See id. at 73.
182 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
183 See id. at 1101; see also Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d
381, 387 (9th Cir. 1995). However, under the "nerve center" approach advocated by some critics,
the Canadian damages award would have been included in the total damages figure. See infra Part
IV.D.I.
184 See Austin, supra note 1, at 9.
185 The studio in Xanadu, however, distributes unauthorized derivative works in the United
States for profit. If X can get personal jurisdiction over the art studio, it would be vulnerable under
this theory.
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borders. 187 Thus, contributory-infringement doctrine incorporates the "objective
territorial principle," thereby preventing federal courts from engaging in the
problematic balancing tests which implicate the separation-of-powers issues
discussed in Part III.D. 188 Although the doctrine does not come directly from the
text of the 1976 Copyright Act, federal courts have created it on the basis of §
106's grant of power giving copyright holders the authority to both exercise
various prerogatives themselves and authorize others to' exercise these preroga-
tives. 1'89
Foreign sellers are particularly vulnerable under this doctrine when they
have reason to know that their products are likely to be distributed in the United
States. Their behavior in such instances can be considered akin to the purposeful
direction of conduct into the United States that a gunman standing across the
Canadian border and firing into the United States would achieve. Furthermore,
the defendant in GB Marketing USA, Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH &
Co.' 90 unsurprisingly lost its allegation that the federal district court did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction over its extraterritorial conduct. In Gerolsteiner, the
defendant company manufactured water bottles in Germany containing a label
design which infringed the U.S. plaintiff's copyright; it then sold them to an-
other company which it allegedly knew would export the bottles to the United
States for sale.' 91 Similarly, in P&D International v. Halsey Publishing Co., 192
the court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over disputed extraterritorial
showings of a film because the defendant Cunard Cruise Line requested that
another party copy the film in Florida. Also, in Cable/Home Communication v.
Network Productions,193 the court found subject-matter jurisdiction over meet-
ings held in the British West Indies, where the defendant sold chips for the pur-
pose of descrambling and exploiting U.S. satellite broadcasts. While positioned
abroad, the defendant encouraged or directed the infringing conduct of others
within U.S. borders in all three cases.
These concepts can be applied to the above hypothetical to determine
whether contributory infringement is a viable loophole to the presumption. Spe-
cifically, Q must be guilty of both the knowledge and material-participation
elements quoted above. 94 First, Q must have knowledge of directly infringing
activity within the United States. The American downloaders of Q's website
reproduce the infringing collage in their computers' temporary memory (ran-
187 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 574; Smith, supra note 63, at 16.
188 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 575.
189 See id. at 573 n.335.
190 782 F. Supp. 763 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
191 See id. at 773.
192 672 F. Supp. 1429, 1433 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
193 902 F.2d 829, 846 (11 th Cir. 1990).
194 See Skelton, supra note 2, at 250.
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dom-access memory) every time they visit the website. 195 Under current U.S.
copyright law, they create their own copies within the meaning of the 1976
Copyright Act. 196 They create more copies by saving the collage to a disk or
hard drive or by printing paper images. If the American downloaders give away
any of the paper images or disks, they additionally infringe X's distribution
right. In any event, Q must have had knowledge of these acts of copying and/or
distributing to be liable for contributory infringement. Q, who is very proud of
his work, certainly is aware that the whole purpose of having a home website is
to invite interested observers around the world to access it, thereby creating cop-
ies of its contents in their computers' temporary memory. 197 Though he is not
particularly certain, he probably also should at least be aware that the Americans
who visit his website create and pass around paper and digitized copies of his
collages. 198 Whether or not Q can be said to have constructive knowledge of
further distribution of his derivative work by U.S. browsers (in addition to
knowledge of their infringing reproductions in random-access memory), he un-
doubtedly fulfills this element of the test.
199
Second, by merely making his derivative work available for download-
ing in the United States, Q has also substantially and materially furthered the
directly infringing conduct of the American browsers. 200 But for Q's actions, the
infringing derivative work based on X's photograph would never have been
distributed or reproduced in the United States. Consequently, Q fulfills both
195 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1993); Ad-
vanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 362, 364 n.9 (E.D. Va. 1994);
Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Nonetheless, critics contend
that information in a computer's random-access memory is not stable enough to constitute a copy
for purposes of infringement analysis. See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 591 n.17. The general prin-
ciples of these three decisions appear to have survived the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
which only created a very specific exception for ephemeral digital copies created in connection
with computer repair and maintenance. See JOYCE ET AL, supra note 17 1, at 508.
196 See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 591.
197 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 720-21.
198 Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 590.
199 One should note that Q is probably also a direct infringer of X's copyright. Q's creation of a
derivative work and his act of copying it to his server in Xanadu are events not covered by § 106
of U.S. copyright law. See Austin, supra note 1, at 18; Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 591. However,
by posting his collage on a website accessible in the United States through a server located abroad,
he directly infringes two distinct § 106 rights. See Austin, supra note 1, at 16-17. First, he is pub-
licly displaying the infringing derivative work to American citizens. See Skelton, supra note 2, at
258. Second, he is making the work available for distribution, as U.S. browsers can either print out
paper copies of the collage directly from the webpage or save it to a disk. Infringement of the
distribution right occurs when a work is impermissibly made available to the U.S. public, not just
when the work is actually distributed to them. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 171, at 539, 544;
Skelton, supra note 2, at 257-58. Q's strictly domestic conduct in Xanadu is subject to U.S. copy-
right law by virtue of the enormous reach of any activity on the Internet. Posting material on the
World Wide Web anywhere essentially becomes conduct within the United States.
200 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 721.
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elements and thus is liable for contributory infringement.
This liability - which somehow seems unjust due to the fact that Q de-
sired only to share his legally expressed creative inspiration with as many peo-
ple as possible - illustrates the unwavering difficulty the Internet brings to copy-
right law. 20' Regardless of the fact that Q uploaded his collage in a country
whose government decided that his derivative work is legal, his work is inevita-
bly bound to be accessible someplace on Earth where downloading or publicly
displaying that work constitutes infringement. Q has no control over who actu-
ally accesses his work in what country.20 2 Holding Q liable for contributory in-
fringement under U.S. copyright law works to discourage the dissemination
Xanadu had hoped to encourage with its own unique production/dissemination
tradeoff. It is important to note that the current international intellectual-
property treaty regimes do not set limits on the maximum protection level a
member country may enact; therefore, comparatively restrictive copyright laws
(such as the ones in France20 3 based on notions of moral rights) could potentially
prove quite burdensome in Xanadu. Whether any particular content provider
anywhere on Earth is cognizant that by uploading his work onto the World Wide
Web, he may automatically be subjecting it to the strictest copyright law on
Earth204 - as well as to a significant number of irreconcilable intermediate varia-
tions of other copyright laws20 5 - is a question that must be answered on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account the relative legal sophistication of the content
provider at hand. 206 The knowledge standard under U.S. contributory-
infringement doctrine, however, may appear unjust in that it does not take such
legal understandings into account.20 7 Still, the current scheme of contributory
liability might encourage the widespread development and use of technology
which enables a content provider to block his website's accessibility to any na-
tion he chooses. (In any event, it is doubtful that X will be able to obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction over Q, as will be apparent from the analysis of Part V.A be-
low.)
The next subsection will reveal that under the prevailing view of U.S.
copyright law, K's acts of authorization permitting copying and distribution of
his derivative work to Xanadu buyers are not themselves acts of contributory
infringement. K is also not contributorily liable for the copies that the Xanadu
201 Cf. SLOMANSON, supra note 8, at 223.
202 See O'Sullivan, supra note 85, at 37-38.
203 See, e.g., 1 PATRY, supra note 102, at 1310-11.
204 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 659.
205 See id. at 664 n.143.
206 A related problem is that a sophisticated content provider may try to avoid liability by em-
ploying Internet-service providers in countries with weak copyright laws relative to those enacted
in the content provider's domicile. See id. at 660.
207 A contributory infringer need not be absolutely certain about the illegality of the infringe-
ment he is aiding in order to be held liable. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 171, at 786.
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studio formerly employing him sends into the United States, since he does not
satisfy the first element of the two-part test. Because the studio initiated the U.S.
sales on its own accord after K returned to the United States, K never became
aware of the fact that the art studio extended its market to include infringing
activity. K apparently only knows that such sales would be illegal, otherwise he
would have attempted to sell his own copies of his infringing derivative work
while later residing in the United States.
It seems more probable that K satisfies the substantial-participation
element of the contributory-infringement test. While it is possible for one to
have a contractual relationship which actively induces or causes another party to
commit direct copyright infringement,2 °8 K entered into the licensing arrange-
ment with the Xanadu studio under an original understanding that the license
was supposed to enable it to sell his creative works to citizens in Xanadu. Thus,
it appears unlikely that the licensing arrangement itself actively induces the stu-
dio to distribute infringing derivative works to U.S. customers. Still, K's crea-
tion of the infringing derivative work and continuing authorization definitely
are material aids to its primary infringement, and that alone is sufficient to sat-
isfy the second element of the contributory-infringement test (even if K fails to
satisfy the entire test).
D. Possible Exception for Domestic Acts That Commence a Course of
Infringing Conduct Abroad
Another potential loophole to the presumption against the extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. copyright law is the inverse to a foreign act of contribu-
tory infringement: the situation in which a person in U.S. territory authorizes or
directs activity abroad which would constitute infringement of a U.S. copyright
if performed in the United States (instead of a person abroad directing infringing
conduct within U.S. territory). The loophole relates to a broader exception that
some scholars would recognize for non-infringing acts which commence a
course of infringing conduct without regard for where exploitation will take
place.20 9 This approach was explicitly rejected as a legitimate type of contribu-
tory infringement in Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co. 210 In
Subafilms, the defendant distributor entered into licensing agreements (beyond
what its own licensing arrangement with the copyright holder permitted) author-
izing the foreign videotape distribution of a Beatles film. The Ninth Circuit held
that the plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim under U.S. copyright law,
because the authorization of acts which are not themselves violations of § 106
208 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 718.
209 See O'Sullivan, supra note 85, at 41.
210 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Decisions of other courts following Subafilms in-
clude Fun-Damental Too Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., No. 96 CIV. 1103 (MBM), 1996 WL
724734 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1996), and Iverson v. Grant, 946 F. Supp. 1404 (D.S.D. 1996).
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rights is not an independently infringing act.2 1' Thus, some other primary act of
infringement must occur in the United States in order for infringement of the
authorization right to occur.212 The result in Subafilms is consistent with the
"objective territorial principle ' 213 as well as the general scheme of the Update-
Art and contributory-infringement doctrines, because no predicate element of
reproduction or distribution occurred in the United States.
Nevertheless, U.S. rights holders and potential foreign licensees need to
pay attention to this issue for three reasons: (1) Subafilms has attracted a host of
scholarly criticism, 214 (2) the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, and (3)
two federal district courts outside of the Ninth Circuit have chosen not to follow
it.215 Furthermore, a potential defendant must note precisely where in the United
States a U.S. copyright holder has personal jurisdiction over him. The critics
propose replacing the "root copy" approach with a sort of "nerve-center
liability" regime under which federal courts must apply U.S. copyright law to an
entire lawsuit against a U.S. defendant who - while in U.S. territory - devises
and executes an unauthorized plan to exploit a U.S. copyright anywhere.216 They
contend that the "nerve center" regime is a better interpretation of U.S.
copyright law for four reasons.
1. Criticism of Subafilms
First, critics argue that making liability turn on the physical site of re-
production or public display (as in Update Art) is unduly formalistic; supplying
an unauthorized license is virtually the same as supplying an unauthorized
copy.217 If the unauthorized U.S. licensor needs to provide a copy to the foreign
licensee so that the licensee can commence exploitation, the licensor only needs
to be sure the work is uploaded to and sent from a server (or otherwise physi-
cally copied) outside of the United States.218 In either case, the economic effects
are the same: the U.S. copyright holder's market is usurped.21 9 Likewise, in ei-
ther case, the potential for raising comity issues by discouraging conduct a for-
211 See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1089.
212 See Austin, supra note 1, at 10.
213 See supra text accompanying notes 113, 177-79.
214 See, e.g., John P. Kelsh, Note, Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., The
Berne Convention, and the Extraterritorial Application of the Copyright Act, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.
1839 (1996).
215 See Expediters Int'l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 995 F. Supp.
468, 477 (D.N.J. 1998); Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
216 See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 600.
217 See id. at 596; Monticello, supra note 53, at 133.
218 See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 598-99.
219 See Austin, supra note 1, at 12; Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 598.
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eign government sees as beneficial is the same.220 Like the Mikva view of the
presumption,221 this argument places heavy weight on any conduct having harm-
ful effects within U.S. borders. Moreover, the "nerve center" approach is similar
to § 602222 in that it holds a U.S. actor liable (despite the fact that the materials
in question may have been lawfully made or distributed abroad) due to the
harmful effects on the U.S. copyright owner's exclusive rights.223
Second, critics argue that even though the U.S. authorizer/planner does
not copy, distribute, or publicly display within U.S. territory, he is required to
strategize, contract, or license within U.S. territory in order to be liable under
the "nerve center" approach. Furthermore, he should expect his domestic con-
duct to be regulated by U.S. law - especially when it harms a domestic rights
holder.224 The critics are thus not necessarily contending that the territorial un-
derstanding of copyright law is misplaced or that the overseas licensees in
Subafilms were engaging in conduct that was illegal under U.S. copyright law;
rather, they argue that holding the domestic authorizer liable for domestic con-
duct is consistent both with the presumption against extraterritoriality and with
the framework set out by the Berne Convention.225
Third, critics of Subafilms argue that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of the 1976 Copyright Act partially undermines the statute's incentive system
for encouraging American creation.226 More specifically, they contend that
"[w]hile the domestic market may provide enough of an incentive to create in
most situations, the domestic market may not provide a sufficient reward for
works at the margins of American tastes.', 227 By protecting American authors'
rights to license foreign nationals to exploit their works, "nerve center" liability
facilitates the creation of rare yet valuable contributions to American cultural
heritage.228
Fourth, critics argue that Subafilms misconstrues the text of the U.S.
copyright statute. They say that rather than merely codifying contributory-
liability principles as the Ninth Circuit claims, the plain language of § 106229
220 See Monticello, supra note 53, at 132-33.
221 See supra Part II.C.
222 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1994). See generally supra Part IV.A.
223 See Monticello, supra note 53, at 131-32; supra text accompanying note 172.
224 See Monticello, supra note 53, at 129.
225 See id. at 122, 130. Assuming that the critics have interpreted the statute correctly, Con-
gress's creation of copyright liability for a domestic authorizer/planner is consistent with interna-
tional-law jurisdictional principles such as the subjective-territorial and nationality principles. See
SLOMANSON, supra note 8, at 209; supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
226 See Austin, supra note 1, at 13; Monticello, supra note 53, at 115.
227 Monticello, supra note 53, at 115.
228 See id.
229 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-106A (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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creates a new direct cause of action (completely divorced from third-party-
liability principles) against an authorizer of activities inconsistent with any other
exclusive right.230 Although Congress did state its intention to avoid any
questions regarding the liability of contributory infringers, they claim that it did
so without just crystallizing existing contributory-liability principles. 23 Finally,
they bolster their argument with dicta from Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.232 directly supporting their proposition that the §
106 authorization right is a separate privilege which does not depend on the
exercise of the other § 106 activities within U.S. territory.
2. Rebuttal to Subafilms' Critics
Although the Subafilms critics make several fine points, problems with
the "nerve center" approach nonetheless erode its appeal. First, the "nerve cen-
ter" approach marks a tendency toward expanding the scope of U.S. copyright
law to a point where copyright infringement becomes a tort based on conduct
alone rather than on a violation of property rights, as it has traditionally been
understood.233 The transformation is a result of the simple fact that the estab-
lished territoriality principle underlying copyright law is insensitive to authors'
pocket books. When an artistic or literary creation is present within a foreign
territory, its status as property and its ownership exist only insofar as the foreign
sovereign says they do, regardless of where the creation originated.234 If there is
no existing foreign property to be exploited, the U.S. authorizer/planner can be
235liable only if his domestic conduct somehow constitutes a tort.23 While a con-
duct-based tort scheme of copyright law may be a plausible idea, its judicial
importation into U.S. copyright law changes the basic theoretical foundation on
which that law was written to suit a particular class of disgruntled U.S. citi-
zens.
23 6
Second, as discussed above, 23 7 foreign nations tailor their production-
dissemination tradeoffs to suit their particular cultural needs. But, a "nerve cen-
ter" regime would more frequently disrupt these tradeoffs than the current "root,
copy" regime does by restricting the dissemination of works that otherwise
would have been available in foreign territories. 238 A "nerve center" regime fur-
230 See Monticello, supra note 53, at 108-09.
231 See id. at 110.
232 464 U.S. 417, 419-20 (1984).
233 See Austin, supra note 1, at 20.
234 See id. at 20-21.
235 See id.
236 See id. at 21.
237 See supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
238 See Austin, supra note 1, at 21.
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thermore implicates issues of international comity to a greater extent than the
''root copy" approach.
Third, the "nerve center" alternative to Subafilms fails to take into con-
sideration the legitimate interests of U.S. citizens and businesses other than
copyright holders. It fails to explain why it is not sound investment strategy for
a U.S. entity to attempt to enter foreign markets with weaker copyright laws
(perhaps written as such to encourage foreign investment) as well as why these
same entities should be subsidizing U.S. copyright holders for a foreign nation's
decision to enact less protective copyright laws. 239 All in all, the chilling effect
that "nerve center" liability has on various sectors of the U.S. economy is an
important factor that must enter the equation, and such sensitive policy balances
can really only be conducted competently and democratically by the nonjudicial
branches, as discussed in Part II.D above. Furthermore, Subafilms's reliance on
the presumption against extraterritoriality may have been entirely appropriate
given that the authorization issue raises separation-of-powers concerns. If Con-
gress believes that the effects of "nerve center" activity in the United States on
U.S. copyright holders outweigh both the chilled foreign commerce for other
domestic business sectors and the denial of dissemination to foreigners (whose
governments permit access to certain classes of works), then Congress can make
the lines of demarcation more explicit. In this respect, § 602 is inconsistent with
a judicially created "nerve center" regime because it demonstrates that Congress
is able and willing to sacrifice foreign interests for the alleviation of harmful
effects on U.S. copyright holders. 240 However, if a federal court unilaterally
takes a "nerve center" approach to the 1976 Copyright Act by choosing not to
follow Subafilms, the proper type of policy analysis never takes place. If such
analysis did occur, it is not clear that relatively insignificant domestic harms
such as the loss of creative works at the margins of American tastes are enough
to outweigh the issues of international comity raised by "nerve center" liabil-
ity.
24 1
Fourth, while the "nerve center" approach is ideally suited for a situa-
tion in which both parties to a copyright dispute are U.S. domiciliaries in direct
242competition with one another within foreign markets, the Berne Convention
may make containing its application to that scenario impossible given the fact
that it requires national treatment and permits foreign nationals to own U.S.
copyrights.243 For example, a foreign member of Berne ("Xerex") may legiti-
mately have a more expansive scheme of fair-use rights, making conduct that
would be illegal in the United States lawful in Xerex. A citizen of Xerex ("A")
239 See id.
240 See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc).
241 See supra Part II.F.
242 See Austin, supra note 1, at 27.
243 See id. at 27-28.
2002]
35
Wollman: Maneuvering through the Landmines of Multiterritorial Copyright L
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
could also own copyrights under both U.S. and Xerex law for the same work. If
another citizen of Xerex ("B") authorizes conduct in Xerex protected by a fair-
use defense there but illegal in the United States, it is not clear that A would be
unable to sue B for infringement of his U.S. copyright in a U.S. federal district
court, because the critics of Subafilms say that hinging liability on predicate acts
of copying or distributing in U.S. territory is insensible. If some act of copying
or distributing does not need to take place within U.S. borders, then why would
the distinct right of authorization - which they claim is completely divorced
from the exercise of other exclusive rights within U.S. territory - need to occur
there? Under the national-treatment principle, A should have the same inde-
pendent right to authorize the exploitation of his other § 106 rights in every
member country, just as any other U.S.-domiciled rights holder would have.
Maybe the distinction drawn in Subafilms was not so unduly formalistic.
Whatever the viability of this potential exception to the presumption
may be in future U.S. copyright law, the original hypothetical clearly shows that
it would not be at all applicable to Q, who authorizes no foreign conduct that
would be infringing under U.S. copyright law. If Subafilms is overruled, the
exception most certainly would result in K's liability to X for contributory in-
fringement because K continually authorizes the Xanadu studio formerly em-
ploying him to copy and distribute to Xanadu purchasers additional derivative
collages containing X's photograph.
E. Applying Foreign Law to an Infringement Suit Brought in the United
States
Applying foreign copyright law to a suit brought in the United States is
not so much an exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality as it is a
recognition of it. Still, it is another means by which a U.S. rights holder might
obtain relief in a U.S. federal court for foreign infringing conduct.244 A copy-
right cause of action -just like the common-law right to prevent unfair competi-
tion - is known as a transitory cause of action, meaning that an infringement suit
may be heard in any court with jurisdiction over the defendant.245 It also does
not fall within the rule forbidding U.S. courts to apply foreign penal, regulatory,
and revenue laws or to apply other foreign laws contradicting strong American
public policy. 246 The global marketplace has precipitated a general trend in U.S.
247courts toward being more receptive to applying foreign law. Under the de-
244 See id. at 4; Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 601.
245 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCtPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 16.3, at 683 (1989);
Smith, supra note 63, at 17.
246 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 576.
247 See O'Sullivan, supra note 85, at 41. Additionally, foreign copyright owners protected in
the United States by the Berne Convention will find that when they bring an infringement suit
against a U.S. defendant in the Second Circuit for exploitive conduct in the United States, the
district court will split the issues involved and apply the copyright owners' foreign law to deter-
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funct lex loci delicti rule as well as under more modem choice-of-law method-
ologies, U.S. federal courts have long applied foreign law in transnational tort
and contract cases.248
In spite of this general trend, U.S. courts have often been unwilling to
entertain claims based on foreign intellectual-property laws.249 For example, the
court in ITSI T.V. Products v. California Authority of Racing Fairs250 used the
difficulty of discerning and applying Mexican copyright law as a reason for
dismissing a claim by a U.S. company against a Mexican company. 251 The tide
did at least seem to begin turning with London Film Productions, Ltd. v. Inter-
continental Communications, Inc.,252 a case in which a New York corporation
caused three motion pictures to be shown in Chile, where a British corporation
owned the copyright by means of the Berne Convention. Because there was no
other forum where personal jurisdiction over the defendant existed, the court
refused to dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, in-
stead applying Chilean law to the infringement suit in the United States.253 The
federal court also expressed hope that foreign courts would be encouraged to
reciprocate and consider suits brought by U.S. businesses under U.S. law.2
This approach is attractive for a variety of reasons. First, the rules gov-
erning proof of foreign law in federal courts have been relaxed.255 Second,
whereas all the obstacles to applying U.S. copyright law extraterritorially have
thus far involved problems with the federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction
of a federal court to hear a U.S. copyright-law claim concerning foreign infring-
mine ownership issues - including the applicability of the work-for-hire and joint-authorship
doctrines - but will apply domestic law to issues involving what rights are protected, their scope,
and available remedies. See JOYCE, supra note 171, at 801-04. The Second Circuit has reasoned
that because neither the Berne Convention nor the U.S. Copyright Act contains a choice-of-law
provision for determining ownership in transnational copyright cases, federal courts must develop
federal common law to fill in the gaps. See id. at 802-03. Identifying a copyright as a form of
property, the Second Circuit has used the choice-of-law test normally assigned to property dis-
putes (the "most significant relationship" test) and then applied Russian copyright law to deter-
mine only whether a newspaper or its journalists owned the copyrights at issue. See id. at 804-05.
Although this situation is not particularly relevant to a U.S. copyright holder attempting to recover
for overseas exploitation, it does demonstrate the federal judiciary's increased willingness to apply
foreign law to copyright disputes in the United States - even if only to a limited number of issues.
248 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 576.
249 See e.g., Frink Am., Inc. v. Champion Road Mach. Ltd., 961 F. Supp. 398, 404 (N.D.N.Y.
1997); see Austin, supra note 1, at 4; Bradley, supra note 3, at 577; Monticello, supra note 53, at
133-34.
250 785 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
251 Id. at 866.
252 580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
253 See Smith, supra note 63, at 16 (citing London Film, 580 F.Supp. at 49).
254 See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 49.
255 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 576.
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ing conduct, this loophole bypasses those problems by basing federal subject-
matter jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship rather than on the existence of a
federal question.256 Third, it vindicates the rationales based on international law
and comity (articulated earlier in Parts III.E-F) supporting the presumption
against extraterritoriality instead of implicating them, as a true exception to the
presumption would. Fourth, unlike liability for direct infringement, liability for
authorization, direction, or other contributory infringement is rarely territorially
confined under any system's copyright law; therefore, in a Subafilms-type sce-
nario, the U.S. plaintiff may try to invoke foreign-copyright-law provisions that
make the U.S.-based authorizer liable for contributory infringement.257 This
invocation would have the further advantage of applying the same copyright
regime to both the primary and the contributory infringements, if both were at
issue.258
Although this approach will certainly be of great future importance to
the worldwide protection of U.S. copyright holders, the fact that it is of little use
to X - as the activities of Q and K were perfectly legal under the laws of
Xanadu - demonstrates that it is not a panacea.
V. FURTHER OBSTACLES TO RECOVERY IN A U.S. COURT ONCE A LOOPHOLE
TO THE PRESUMPTION IS FOUND
Although a U.S. rights holder hoping to obtain relief in U.S. courts for
conduct occurring abroad has the above five potential options available despite
the presumption, four obstacles still remain.
A. The Obstacle of Personal Jurisdiction
In all infringement cases brought before U.S. federal district courts, the
particular court hearing the claim must be in a state having personal jurisdiction
over the defendant regardless of whether he is a foreign or a U.S. citizen trying
to exploit the plaintiff's copyrighted work abroad. Having personal jurisdiction,
in turn, usually requires satisfying the long-arm statute of the state in which the
district court sits259 as well as meeting the Due Process Clause requirements set
by the Supreme Court.260 Because state long-arm statutes tend to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction up to the constitutional maximum, the inquiry normally col-
lapses into a single due-process analysis under the U.S. Constitution. When the
question arising is whether or not "specific jurisdiction" (rather than "general
256 However, a host of new issues arises under diversity jurisdiction. See infra Part V.C.
257 See Austin, supra note 1, at 20.
258 See id.
259 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 650.
260 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 578 (citing International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,
Office of Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945).
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jurisdiction") exists with respect to a particular defendant, the due-process
analysis has two required components: a "minimum contacts" test and a "fair
play and substantial justice" test.261 "General jurisdiction" always exists when a
party is domiciled in the forum court's territory.262
In the above hypothetical, because the federal district court in the U.S.
state where K returned to be domiciled unquestionably has "general
jurisdiction" over him for any and all claims against him for which there is
federal subject-matter jurisdiction, there is no personal-jurisdiction issue
concerning K. With regard to Q, however, this analysis will reveal that it is
dubious whether any U.S. federal district court would have "specific
jurisdiction" over him, even if it were clear that subject-matter jurisdiction
existed for a direct- or contributory-infringement claim brought against Q.
Because specific jurisdiction only arises when the sufficient "minimum
contacts" of the defendant are the same ones giving rise to the legal claim at
issue, Q's travel to the United States and return to Xanadu with his legally
purchased copy of X's photograph are not part of the analysis. X's infringement
claim does not arise out of these legitimate activities. Instead, the claim arises
out of Q's act of uploading his collage to the server hosting his home website in
Xanadu, thereby making his unauthorized derivative work accessible to the
random-access memory of American citizens' computers.
1. Minimum-Contacts Test
In order to pass the minimum-contacts test in an international context,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant's contacts were such that he could
reasonably expect to be called into a U.S. court because he "purposely availed"
himself of the privileges of engaging in activities in a forum U.S. state.263 For a
foreign defendant such as Q, contacts with the United States as a whole - in-
stead of with a specific state - may be aggregated in order to meet the test.264
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) permits this result when two conditions
are met: (1) the claim arises under federal law, and (2) the defendant lacks suffi-
cient contacts with any one state to support personal jurisdiction under any
state's long-arm statute.265 Notably, when a U.S. plaintiff sues a defendant under
foreign copyright law according to the loophole described in Part IV.E above,
subject-matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and not on the
existence of a federal question; therefore, this Rule 4(k)(2) luxury is not avail-
able in such a case.
261 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 642.
262 See II PATRY, supra note 102, at 1082.
263 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
264 But cf Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S.
102, 113(1987).
265 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
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The primary issue of "purposeful availment" in turn requires considera-
tion of several other factors in Internet cases. There are currently two possible
ways by which a foreign defendant can purposefully avail himself of a U.S. state
(or the country as a whole) through the Internet. First, if a foreign defendant
uses the World Wide Web to "commercially exploit" a United States market,
this standard will likely be met. A foreigner who (1) transacts or solicits busi-
ness by means of the Internet with the aim of direct pecuniary gain, (2) derives
revenue by granting access to his website, or (3) publishes advertising for a fee
calculated according to the number of hits in a particular territory is commer-
cially exploitive.266 For example, in Compuserve v. Patterson,267 the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that the defendant had purposely availed himself of the forum state by
having his software posted on the Internet and downloaded into computers lo-
cated in the forum for fees transmitted back to the defendant.268 With regard to
the first type of commercial exploitation, though, federal district courts disagree
on whether the ubiquitous nature of Internet advertising is a solicitation suffi-
ciently targeting any one state or country to constitute purposeful availment.269
In the above hypothetical, Q has done nothing to commercially exploit
the U.S. market, as he created his home website merely for the personal satisfac-
tion of publicly displaying his derivative artistic work as permitted by the copy-
right laws of Xanadu. Q is also not selling space for advertisements, so he does
not depend on U.S. citizens' access for revenue based on the number of "hits"
obtained by his website. On the other hand, the Xanadu studio formerly employ-
ing K is using the Internet to contract for the sale of K's infringing collage to
U.S. citizens and thus appears to have purposely availed itself of a particular
American state (or of the U.S. economic market as a whole).
Second, if the website of a foreign defendant is both interactive and ac-
tually accessed by U.S. residents, the "purposeful availment" standard will again
likely be met. Federal courts have distinguished between a passive website,
which just posts information - including its owner's advertisements - for people
270to access, and an interactive website, which stimulates communications and
informational exchanges that indicate that the defendant was willing to direct
activity toward the particular forum at issue.271 This difference is illustrated in
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,272 where the Second Circuit found that de-
266 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 646, 665.
267 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
268 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 644.
269 See O'Sullivan, supra note 85, at 32-33.
270 See SLOMANSON, supra note 8, at 226. Passively posting information could be considered
analogous to placing a product in the international stream of commerce and knowing that it will
end up virtually anywhere.
271 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 645.
272 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
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spite the fact that the defendant allegedly infringed the plaintiffs trademark by
posting its infringing jazz-club name on its home website (accessible in New
York), the defendant had not purposely availed itself of the New York forum.
273
Instead, it merely displayed information primarily intended to be accessed by
the people around Missouri who would most likely be inclined to visit the jazz
club.274 If a website is interactive but noncommercial, the law appears to require
something to counterbalance the noncommercial nature in order for purposeful
availment to occur. Furthermore, a sufficiently large number of hits showing
actual, significant access may be required to prove that an interactive, noncom-
mercial website meets the "purposeful availment" standard with respect to a
U.S. forum.
275
In the above hypothetical, Q's website is clearly not interactive because
it merely displays his art work without demanding an exchange of information.
In conclusion, it appears that there is no way for X to obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over Q, even if he has a valid claim for direct or contributory infringement,
because Q's website is neither commercially exploitive nor interactive.
2. Test for Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Once the minimum-contacts test has been met, an exercise of personal
jurisdiction may still be rendered unreasonable if fairness factors substantially
weigh against it.277 In an international context, the factors include the burden on
a defendant having to answer an infringement claim in the United States, the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining effective relief, the interest of the United States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, and the substantive poli-
cies of other nations affected by the exercise of jurisdiction. 278 In the hypotheti-
cal scenario, the burden on a single, noncorporate defendant such as Q to defend
a suit in the United States is quite large, and the nation of Xanadu is also inter-
ested in achieving the social gains and increased dissemination it anticipated in
passing its weaker version of copyright law.279 Therefore, assuming arguendo
that the above minimum-contacts test was satisfied with respect to Q, a substan-
tially large effect in the United States would need to result from actual access by
U.S. citizens in order to establish a fair exercise of personal jurisdiction.2 80 An
273 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 644 (citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp., 126 F.3d at 30-
33).
274 See id.
275 See id. at 648.
276 See supra note 199 and text accompanying notes 194-201.
277 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 643.
278 See id.
279 See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
280 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 653.
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exercise of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional if the U.S. public interest con-
sisted merely of vindicating a single download of Q's website into a U.S. citi-
zen's RAM, subject to possible long-term storage on a computer hard drive.281
Nonetheless, as the frequency of the downloads increases, X's nonpecuniary
interest in preventing the infringement of his public-display right eventually
rises to the point at which exercising jurisdiction is fair; while the number of hits
this condition would require is unclear, it appears to be significantly high. 28 2
This number would be decreased, however, every time a copy of the collage in
RAM was saved to any more permanent storage device and/or disseminated,
because the U.S. browser would then be infringing two additional exclusive
rights of X and potentially causing him to lose profits from his own sales. 283
Most likely, then, personal jurisdiction over Q could not be attained
with absolute certainty, even assuming arguendo that he had minimum contacts
with the United States. Still, the fairness factors would probably not preclude
personal jurisdiction over the art studio that once employed K, as it purposely
decided to extend its reach for pecuniary gain beyond Xanadu through
numerous transactions using interactive Internet devices.
B. The Act-of-State Doctrine Obstacle
The act-of-state doctrine declares that "the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another ... done within its
own territory. ' '284 This doctrine presents an obstacle by creating a potential basis
for dismissal when subject-matter and personal jurisdiction otherwise exist.285
Traditionally, federal courts have applied the doctrine to suits which would oth-
erwise require them to determine the validity of an administrative act, such as a
government's grant of patent or trademark rights.286
For several reasons, this doctrine is not much of a hurdle for a U.S.
plaintiff bringing a copyright infringement suit in a U.S. court under foreign
copyright law (according to the loophole presented in Part IV.E). First, the Su-
preme Court has clearly stated that the doctrine only applies when the adjudica-
tion of an issue in a suit compels a court to determine the validity of an official
act of a foreign sovereign.287 Such a determination is not normally required to
decide merely whether or not a private defendant infringed a foreign-created
281 See id. at 653-54.
282 See id. at 655.
283 See id. at 654-55.
284 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
285 See Austin, supra note 1, at 29-30.
286 See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 646 (2nd Cir. 1956).
287 See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990).
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288
copyright. Second, unlike registered rights such as patents and trademarks,
copyrights usually do not owe their existence to administrative formalities. 89
Therefore, a federal court will likely avoid sensitive diplomatic issues when
initially determining whether foreign copyright protection exists (before deter-
mining whether the foreign right was infringed). 9°
While the act-of-state doctrine is not much of an obstacle, a U.S. author,
artist, or composer desiring the application of foreign copyright law still needs
to be wary of whether the foreign government happens to require administrative
acts as a prerequisite for protection.291 If so, an unhappy foreign defendant (or a
U.S. defendant operating abroad) will assuredly challenge their validity.
C. The Obstacle of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Most of the limits on the extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright
law discussed prior to Part V have actually been limitations on the subject-
matter jurisdiction of federal courts applying U.S. copyright law.292 When a fed-
eral judge can see from the outset that the complaint states no claim cognizable
under a federal statute because it does not apply to the defendant's behavior,293
one of two possible bases for federal subject-matter jurisdiction is eliminated.294
At that point, no choice-of-law rule for diversity cases can rescue the 1976
Copyright Act from inapplicability; not even the consent of both parties or the
passage of time can save a case from dismissal for lack of subject-matter juris-
diction, unlike in the area of personal jurisdiction.295 However, if a U.S. plaintiff
bases his infringement suit on a claim of foreign copyright-law infringement, 96
the proprietary right in question is one created by foreign law, so there is simply
288 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 581.
289 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.03, at 17-23
(1997).
290 See Austin, supra note 1, at 29.
291 A member of the Berne Convention, however, cannot impose formalities on the citizens of
other members in order for those citizens to obtain copyright protection in that member country.
See II PATRY, supra note 102, at 1273-74.
292 See id. at 1089.
293 That is, the copyright statute does not apply because he exploited an exclusive right abroad
or directed such a result from within the United States.
294 See, e.g., Northwestern Univ. v. City of Evanston, No. 00 C 7309, 2001 WL 219632, at *2
(N.D. 111. March 6, 2001); FunDamental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., No. 96 Civ. 1103,
1996 WL 724734, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1996); Iverson v. Grant, 946 F. Supp. 1404, 1410-14
(W.D.S.D. 1996); cf. Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Cont'l Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1442-43
(9th Cir. 1986), overruled by Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088
(9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). But cf Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1091 n.5.
295 See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999).
296 See supra Part IV.E.
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no U.S. statute even to apply extraterritorially.2 97 Such a U.S. plaintiff cannot
rely on federal-question jurisdiction and so must find another basis for the
court's subject-matter jurisdiction in order to avoid dismissal of his copyright
claim. The other possible basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction is diversity
jurisdiction, 98 which requires (1) that the citizenship of the parties be com-
pletely diverse and (2) that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.299 This
is the type of jurisdiction on which a U.S. plaintiff bringing suit under foreign
copyright law, as discussed in Part IV.E, would necessarily need to rely.
There are two problems that arise in such a situation. First, the defen-
dant can engage in a significant amount of infringement in the foreign country
before he reaches the $75,000 threshold. If the plaintiff is ill equipped to bring
an infringement suit in a foreign land, the defendant is virtually immune from
suit to the extent of $75,000. Second, in the hypothetical, if X and K now reside
in the same U.S. state, and X brings suit against K in federal district court under
a subsequently revised, more restrictive Xanadu copyright statute,3° the suit will
be dismissed for lack of diversity. In either of these situations, the plaintiff could
bring the suit under foreign copyright law in a state court. However, because
U.S. copyright law is the exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction of federal
courts, state courts are generally unfamiliar and uncomfortable hearing any
kind of copyright-infringement suit and thus are quite likely to dismiss the claim
on forum non conveniens 30 2 or other grounds, leaving the U.S. plaintiff without
a forum (except for the one abroad).
In either of the two problem situations just described, the claim could
still be adjudicated in federal court if acts of multiterritorial infringement result
in good-faith allegations under both U.S. and foreign copyright law.304 In such
instances, the federal court may exercise "supplemental jurisdiction" over non-
federal claims that are factually interwoven with the U.S. federal-law claims.30 5
But, if the federal-law question fails at any point during the course of litigation,
the federal court has discretion to dismiss the pendant nonfederal claims that it
was only adjudicating as a result of the federal law's presence.3° Professor
297 See Austin, supra note 1, at 18 n.74.
298 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
299 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 640 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332).
300 X chooses to base his case on diversity jurisdiction because the limitations resulting from
Subafilms and its progeny apply.
301 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
302 See infra Part V.D.
303 See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 601.
304 See id.
305 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994); UMWA v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Wright v. Asso-
ciated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994).
3W See § 1367.
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Ginsburg advocates retaining jurisdiction over the remaining pendant claims as
a matter of judicial economy, because the court has already become acquainted
with the facts of the suit, and the alternatives mean sending the action to a state
court that is not well versed in either domestic or foreign copyright law or splin-
tering the action among the courts of numerous jurisdictions - much to the U.S.
plaintiff's dismay.3 °7
D. The Obstacle of Forum Non Conveniens
Anytime an infringement case commences before a federal court and a
foreign country is a more convenient forum for the suit, there is a chance that
the defendant will move for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conven-
iens, even if both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction exist.30 8 Because
courts apply the doctrine with discretion according to the particular facts of each
case, it has produced somewhat unpredictable results. 309 Dismissal is supposed
to be the exception and not the rule because there is a presumption in favor of
the plaintiff's forum choice.31 ° Yet, the presumption is often greatly diminished
for foreign plaintiffs, 1 ' though the reduction appears to be incompatible with
U.S. treaty obligations prohibiting discrimination against foreigners utilizing
U.S. courts to bring intellectual-property claims. 312 Nevertheless, the Second
Circuit has interpreted the "national treatment" provision of the Berne Conven-
tion as not specifically covering pure access to U.S. courts and thus not mandat-
ing an equal presumption in favor of foreign plaintiffs.31 3
Surprisingly, a forum-non-conveniens dismissal might obtain not just
when a federal district court hears a case under foreign copyright law pursuant
to its diversity jurisdiction 314 but also when it adjudicates a case under federal-
question jurisdiction. In Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech Systems PTE,
Ltd.,315 the Singaporean defendant copied the Singaporean plaintiffs computer
program in Singapore, infringing the reproduction right in that country, and then
distributed the copies in the United States, infringing the distribution right under
U.S. law; U.S. law protected the program as a result of its being first published
307 See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 602.
308 See O'Sullivan, supra note 85, at 34-35.
309 See id. at 34.
310 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 580.
311 See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 1173, 1176-77 (4th
ed. 1999).
312 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 580 n.371.
313 See Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 290-91 (2d Cir. 1996).
314 See supra Part I.E.
315 61 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1995).
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in the United States according to the Berne Convention.3 16 Although he could
have done so, the plaintiff did not try to join claims for unauthorized copying
and distribution under Singaporean law, so the entire case was based on U.S.
copyright-law infringement. 3? 7 Emphasizing in part that an insignificant U.S.
public interest in such a case between foreign litigants was present, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the forum-non-conveniens dismissal of the suit.318 It declared that
its analysis would have been the same for a plaintiff who was a U.S. national
and thus took a "source" approach to forum-non-conveniens analysis for
multiterritorial copyright claims. 319 Nevertheless, this Ninth Circuit decision
was questionable, because (1) it is inconsistent with its own and other federal
circuits' cases drawing on the nationality of the plaintiff as a key to dismissal,
and (2) it may require a tedious inquiry into the substantive fairness of the
"source" country's copyright law in order to avoid encouraging the development
of copyright havens.32
The decision whether or not to dismiss a case under this doctrine in-
volves a two-part inquiry.
1. The Availability of an Adequate Alternative Forum
First, a defendant moving for dismissal must be able to show that an
adequate alternative forum with jurisdiction is available for the plaintiff.32' The
problem with this prong of the inquiry is that in the age of the Internet, the
prong is too easily yet unsatisfactorily satisfied. The digitization of information
and the Internet make possible infringing reproductions and distributions of a
single copyright holder's work that occur suddenly in numerous forums, each
having jurisdiction over a small portion of the aggregate result. Twenty-five
different jurisdictions may be alternative forums for various portions of multiter-
ritorial, Internet-based copyright-infringement cases, but the plaintiff may be
unable to bear the burden of litigating in each and every foreign court.3 22 Often,
the only place where all infringement claims can be legally consolidated is the
defendant's home forum.
323
This situation was indeed the case in Boosey & Hawkes Music
i
316 See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 594 (citing Creative Technology, 61 F.3d at 701-05).
317 See id. at 593.
318 See id.
319 See id. at 594.
320 See id. at 594-95.
321 See Austin, supra note 1, at 31 (citing Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt
Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 491 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d
41,46 (2d Cir. 1996))).
322 See O'Sullivan, supra note 85, at 36-37.
323 See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 600.
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Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co.,324 where the U.S. defendant distributed
videotapes of its film in eighteen different countries, though its licensing
contract for a piece of Russian music incorporated into the film only permitted
use of the music for theater exhibition.325 Because the incorporated music was
not protected by U.S. copyright law, the copyright laws of the eighteen countries
had to determine the copyright-licensing issues.326 The Second Circuit vacated
the district court's forum-non-conveniens dismissal, reasoning that the private
factors discussed below clearly weighed against forcing the plaintiff to litigate
in eighteen separate forums.327
2. The Balancing of Private and Public Factors
Second, the court must also determine that a balancing test weighs in
favor of dismissal after considering both private and public/systemic factors.
328
The private factors include (1) the availability of compulsory process to obtain
the presence of unwilling witnesses, (2) the costs of obtaining the attendance of
willing witnesses, (3) the ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the ability to
view any relevant premises, (5) the need to apply complex bodies of law, (6) the
availability of appropriate remedies, and (7) the convenience of the chosen fo-
rum to each party.329 In certain instances - such as a case that would be dis-
missed in favor of adjudication in a "copyright haven" - an additional and pre-
dominant factor may be added when an unfavorable change in substantive law
would result in a remedy "so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no
remedy at all. 33° In that instance, an unfavorable law change could potentially
be a relevant eighth consideration.
The primary public/systemic factor in the forum-non-conveniens analy-
sis of transnational copyright litigation is the strength of another country's inter-
est in having localized controversies decided at home.331 Though copyright in-
fringement is considered a transitory cause of action,332 it still retains a very
local aspect, as a country's copyright law regulates access to important cultural
resources and the exchange of ideas.333 Furthermore, even without being subject
324 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
325 See Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 599 (citing Boosey, 145 F.3d at 481-86).
326 See Austin, supra note 1, at 32 (citing Boosey, 145 F.3d at 491).
327 See id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235 (1981)).
328 See id. at 31.
329 See id.; Burmeister, supra note 48, at 656.
330 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254-55 (1981).
331 See Austin, supra note 1, at 31.
332 See supra text accompanying note 245.
333 See Austin, supra note 1, at 34, 37.
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to a registration system, 334 a copyright statute has strong political importance to
its enacting jurisdiction, and its adjudication by another country's court could
conceivably raise diplomatic issues similar to those that would be raised by the
adjudication of foreign land or patent rights.335 This tension is precisely why
federal courts utilize an American common-law jurisdictional prohibition
against applying foreign "public" laws, such as revenue and penal statutes.336
Similarly, if a U.S. federal court cannot apply U.S. antitrust law to anticompeti-
tive behavior in a foreign jurisdiction, it will apply no antitrust law. 337 There-
fore, the public/systemic factor of the test's second prong should theoretically
weigh in favor of forum-non-conveniens dismissal so that the enacting jurisdic-
tion may adjudicate the copyright claim.
However, Professor Austin argues that in order to apply the pub-
lic/systemic factor to foreign copyright law, federal courts must engage in a
comparative analysis of various foreign bodies of law, ranking them according
to their political importance and sensitivity.338 He concludes that this factor can-
not meaningfully inform a court's analysis of whether or not to retain jurisdic-
tion based on the nature of copyright law per se, because there is no articulable
basis by which courts (having comparatively low governmental resources) can
distinguish the political significance of different bodies of foreign law from one
another, unless the nature of the copyright issue at hand is constitutional.339
If Professor Austin's argument is influential, the private factors will un-
doubtedly consume the forum-non-conveniens analysis of copyright cases. Of
these factors, the one inquiring into the need to apply complex bodies of law
will not tend to favor dismissal. The risk that a U.S. court will misapply an ap-
plicable foreign copyright law is not any different than the risk it will do so in
any other area of private international law.34° More importantly, the most recent
public-international-law agenda has focused on the harmonization of all nations'
intellectual property laws by means of achieving universal minimum stan-
dards; 341 this approach discourages enormous copyright-law deviations which
might otherwise cause foreign copyright laws to appear complex.
The issue of the availability of appropriate remedies will most likely not
favor dismissal. It will favor dismissal only when the remedy sought by the
plaintiff is unenforceable, as would be the case with a cross-border injunction
334 See supra Part V.B.
335 See Austin, supra note 1, at 35, 37.
336 See id. at 37-38.
337 See id. at 38.
338 See id. at 39.
339 See id. at 40.
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directing that infringing materials produced in a foreign land be destroyed. 342 It
will be rare, though, for a plaintiff to be foolish enough to ask for such a rem-
edy. But, if a defendant has assets located in the United States, the availability
of appropriate remedies is not likely to favor dismissal when a plaintiff requests
an award of damages under foreign law; moreover, the choice-of-law problem
regarding whether damage remedies involve procedural or substantive law (and
thus are governed by forum law or foreign law, respectively) has been simpli-
fied by the Supreme Court's holding in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc.343 Although the quantum of damages recoverable in diversity cases was
traditionally considered a procedural issue separately governed by forum law,
Gasperini suggests that the governing substantive law (under a federal court's
diversity jurisdiction) creating a right to recover damages should also determine
the amount of damages.3"
The unpredictability and inconsistencies of U.S. forum non conveniens
doctrine - and specifically, of the public/systemic factor's application to foreign
copyright law - create difficulties in applying the two-part test to a situation in
which X brought suit against Q in a U.S. federal district court, and Q moved for
dismissal. Nonetheless, four points are worth noting. First, Xanadu would pre-
sumably be an adequate alternative forum with personal jurisdiction over Q, so
the motion would then be resolved under the balancing test. Second, because X
is a U.S. citizen, the presumption in favor of his forum choice would be strong,
making a denial of the motion more likely. Third, if the federal court happens to
discover that the substantive-law change resulting from a move of the litigation
to Xanadu would deny X any basis for recovery (which it would do in this hypo-
thetical), that one factor may assure a denial of Q's motion to dismiss. Fourth,
when the premises to be viewed and the sources of proof are accessible over the
Internet in any country, the ease of access to evidence would also favor a denial
of the motion to dismiss. 345 On balance then, the federal district court would
likely deny Q's dismissal motion based on this doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
A U.S. copyright holder hoping to obtain relief for the foreign exploita-
tion of his copyright faces significant pitfalls along the way to recovery. This
Article attempts to map these pitfalls and provide guidance for maneuvering
around them. The justifications for the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of U.S. copyright law are so strong with respect to this federal stat-
ute that the presumption is a mainstay of it, at least for the foreseeable future.
Thus, the presumption itself is the first major hurdle for a U.S. rights holder.
342 See id. at 44-45.
343 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
3" See Austin, supra note 1, at 45.
345 See Burmeister, supra note 48, at 656.
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Even if one of the existing five potential legal options (enabling a U.S. copy-
right holder to reach exploitive foreign conduct) is applicable to the particular
situation, a U.S. rights holder must be certain that the U.S. court in which he
brings suit has both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. The copyright
holder must also guard against dismissal motions based on the forum-non-
conveniens and act-of-state doctrines. The roadmap provided by this Article will
become increasingly useful as the Internet and the digitization of information in
general facilitate the spread of works protected by U.S. copyright law through-
out the planet.
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